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  1 
THE HANDS OF THE STATE: THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE 
AND RESIDENTIAL TENANTS’ RIGHTS IN ARKANSAS 
Lynn Foster* 
“A healthy society depends on fair and balanced laws.”1 
Two recent independent reports have revealed that Arkansas’s residen-
tial landlord-tenant law is significantly out of balance with that of other 
states and, moreover, is arguably unconstitutional in part. How did this 
come about, and why is Arkansas so different? 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A lease is both a conveyance of a property interest and a contract. The 
tenant receives a leasehold in return for adhering to the lease covenants. 
Under common law, all of the parties’ lease covenants (except the implied 
covenant of quiet enjoyment) were independent.2 This meant that, in theory, 
if a tenant breached the covenant to pay rent, a landlord could not terminate 
the lease and eject the tenant, but instead had to sue in court to recover rent 
as it was due.3 Similarly, if a landlord had covenanted to make repairs and 
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 1. NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS 
REPORT (2012), reprinted in 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 739 (2013) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/
file%20attachments/Landlord-Tenant%20Commission%20Report.pdf (last visited Jul. 23, 
2013). 
 2. See generally 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.02(a) (2d Thomas ed. 2004); 
Tom G. Guerts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate, 32 REAL 
EST. L.J. 356, 356; Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 229 n.6 
(1969–70). 
 3. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (3d ed. 
2000); Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2, at 228 n.4. Landlords also used self-help eviction, but 
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did not, the tenant could not terminate the lease, but had to continue to pay 
rent and instead enforce the repair covenant in court.4 
As a result of the unwieldiness of the independent covenants, in the 
nineteenth century states enacted “summary eviction” statutes, allowing 
landlords to evict tenants who failed to pay rent.5 Essentially these statutes 
are an exception to the common-law rule that parties cannot rescind a lease.6 
Further, in the twentieth century, states enacted or judicially adopted im-
plied warranties of habitability, allowing residential tenants to withhold rent 
and even terminate leases if landlords breached their new, implied duty to 
provide and maintain fit and habitable premises.7 Thus, by the end of the 
twentieth century, a rough symmetry in landlord-tenant law once again pre-
vailed. Landlords could terminate leases and evict tenants who breached the 
most important lease covenant from a landlord’s point of view, and residen-
tial tenants who did not have safe and sanitary premises due to a landlord’s 
action or inaction could terminate their leases or withhold rent, to pay for 
either small repairs or essential services, and remain on the premises. 
Arkansas followed the national trend with respect to summary eviction, 
enacting its first unlawful detainer statute in 1875.8 In 1901, however, by the 
slimmest of majorities in the Senate, the Arkansas General Assembly enact-
ed an additional “criminal eviction” statute9 that remains on the books today 
and results in thousands of cases each year in Arkansas.10 No other state has 
such a statute; indeed, Arkansas is the only state that criminalizes a tenant’s 
failure to pay rent while occupying the premises during the lease term. The 
 
their rights to that remedy were slowly restricted until today it is probable that most jurisdic-
tions do not allow self-help by landlords against residential tenants. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN § 
6.80; 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 40.09(b)(1) (2d Thomas ed. 2007). 
 4. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 39.02(a); Quinn & Phillips, supra 
note 2, at 233–34. 
 5. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2, at 228 n.4. The authors note that most statutes allow 
a landlord to terminate a lease for nonpayment even if the lease does not contain a clause 
compelling termination if the rent is not paid. Id.; Arkansas’s statute is of this type. ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 18-60-304 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
 6. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.79. 
 7. See infra notes 217 through 220 for a list of state statutes and cases adopting the 
implied warranty of habitability. 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-301(a) (Repl. 2003). The current unlawful detainer statute 
was enacted in 1981. Id. 
 9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003) (referred to throughout this article as the 
“failure to vacate” statute). See infra text accompanying notes 30 through 35 for an account 
of the Act’s passage. 
 10. See infra Appendix A for a table showing a breakdown of the enforcement of the 
failure to vacate statute by district court. 
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statute, believed by Professor Carol Goforth and others to be unconstitution-
al,11 is enforced unevenly—and in some places not at all—across the state. 
Arkansas further differs from the rest of the states in that it has no im-
plied warranty of habitability. Although there have been repeated attempts 
to introduce the warranty, either by arguing for it in court or introducing it in 
bill form in the legislature, such attempts have been repeatedly rebuffed by 
both the courts and the legislature. 
Two unrelated developments occurred in 2012 and 2013 that focused 
attention on Arkansas residential landlord-tenant law. The first of these was 
the report of the Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-
Tenant Law. The Commission was authorized by statute in 2011.12 Its mem-
bers were appointed by the Governor, legislators, the two Arkansas law 
schools, the Arkansas Bar Association, and various pro-landlord entities.13 
Its charge was to “study, review, and report on the landlord-tenant laws in 
Arkansas and other states.”14 After meeting regularly over an eight-month 
period in 2012, the Commission issued its 36-page report at the end of the 
year. The report contrasted Arkansas law with that of other states in several 
different areas of residential landlord-tenant law and concluded that Arkan-
sas law was significantly out of balance with that of other states.15 Of the 
thirteen unanimous recommendations,16 those relevant here were to repeal 
 
 11. See generally, Carol R. Goforth, Arkansas Code § 18-16-101: A Challenge to the 
Constitutionality and Desirability of Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2003 ARK. L. 
NOTES 21 (2003); NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL SKILLS IN SOCIAL 
CONTEXT SOCIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, RENTERS BEWARE: HOSTILE LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN 
ARKANSAS (March 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The 2001 amend-
ments to the statute were briefly referenced in Amy J. Dunn, Title 18 Survey of Legislation: 
2001 General Assembly, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 549, 553–54 (2002). 
 12. To Create the Non-Legislative Commission for the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws; 
and for Other Purposes, 2011-5 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 613 (LexisNexis). 
 13. The Arkansas Realtors’ Association, Arkansas Bankers’ Association, Landlords’ 
Association of Arkansas, and Arkansas Affordable Housing Association each appointed one 
Commission member. The author was the Vice Chair of the Commission and the drafter of 
the report. 
 14. 2011-5 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 613 (LexisNexis), supra note 12. 
 15. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 16. Interestingly, despite the frank, candid discussions throughout the eight months that 
the Commission met, the circulation of every draft to all Commissioners, the unanimous 
votes of all Commissioners for every recommendation (proposals garnering less than unani-
mous agreement were not included as recommendations), and unanimous approval of the 
final draft after numerous changes at the request of several Commission members (emails on 
file with the author), after the approval and delivery of the final report and unbeknownst to 
the rest of the Commissioners, the five Commissioners who represented landlord and banking 
groups signed their own two-page letter of “clarification” two weeks later and presented it to 
the Governor, Speaker, and President Pro Tem of the Senate (letter on file with the author). 
This letter, however, is not a product of the Commission and its deliberations, as the final 
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the criminal failure to vacate statute after civil eviction procedures were 
reformed, and to enact a statutory implied warranty of habitability.17 
The timing of the Commission’s formation and report was too late for 
bill drafting prior to the 2013 legislative session. Nevertheless, in March, 
four bills (two of which were “shell bills”18) based on the Commission’s 
work were introduced.19 None made it out of their respective judiciary 
committee, not even reaching the stage of testimony before the committees, 
despite widespread media coverage of the Commission Report.20 The second 
development was the Human Rights Watch investigation of the failure to 
vacate statute. The Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit, nongovernmental, 
international human rights organization, sent a researcher to Arkansas in 
2012 who visited courts and interviewed landlords, tenants, attorneys, legal 
experts, and a judge as part of investigating the failure to vacate statute.21 
 
report is. In fact, it was written without the knowledge of the other five Commission mem-
bers. 
 17. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3–5. Other Commission recommendations 
were to 1) streamline the unlawful detainer statute and allow landlords to initiate suit in dis-
trict court; 2) repeal the “civil eviction statute,” ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-701 through 707 
and 901 through 913; 3) codify the already-existing law on landlord self-help evictions; 4) 
enact a statute prohibiting retaliatory eviction; 5) prohibit unconscionable lease provisions; 6) 
enact legislation prohibiting certain provisions in leases that unfairly limit tenants’ rights; 7) 
amend statutes concerning landlords’ access to premises; 8) provide remedies to tenants 
denied of possession of premises at the beginning of the lease term; 9) review unenacted 
sections of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act for applicability in Arkansas; 10) 
allow early termination of leases to endangered victims of domestic violence; and 11) add a 
protected category of sexual orientation to Arkansas’s fair housing statute. Id. at 3–6. The 
commissioners were evenly divided as to whether to repeal Ark. Code Ann. section 18-16-
110, which limits tort liability of landlords, and whether to amend the law with respect to 
security deposits, and thus made no recommendations as to those topics. Id. at 3–6, 25–26. 
 18. A shell bill contains “only a portion of the full bill or merely a short description of 
the bill.” Typically, it is filed close to the deadline for introducing bills. ARKANSAS BUREAU 
OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 8 (2010). 
 19. House Bill 1740, a shell bill to reform landlord-tenant law and implement the find-
ings of the Commission, was introduced on March 6. Senate Bills 947, 950, and 951 were 
introduced on March 11 and March 18. They would have enacted some of the recommenda-
tions of the Commission and created a legislative task force to carry on the work of the 
Commission and draft legislation. 
 20. See, e.g., Arkansas Blog, Commission Recommends Changes in Landlord-Tenant 
Law, ARK. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives
/2013/01/14/commission-recommends-changes-in-landlord-tenant-law (last visited Jul. 23, 
2013); Commission Says Landlord-Tenant Laws “Out of Balance,” THV11 (Jan. 14, 2013) 
http://www.thv11.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=243264 (visited Jul. 23, 2013); There 
Oughta Be a Law: Renter Rights, KATV, Feb. 22, 2013, updated Mar. 24, 2013, 
http://www.katv.com/story/21313099/there-oughta-be-a-law-renter-rights (last visited Jul. 23, 
2013). 
 21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PAY THE RENT OR FACE ARREST: ABUSIVE IMPACTS OF 
ARKANSAS’S DRACONIAN EVICTIONS LAW 1 (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites
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The subsequent report, issued in 2013, criticized the statute for, among other 
reasons, 1) criminalizing tenants on the allegations of landlords without any 
independent investigation; 2) imposing fines, jail time, and criminal records 
on tenants; 3) denying tenants due process; and 4) turning prosecutors and 
city attorneys into “personal attorneys” of landlords.22 
The report noted that unscrupulous landlords could file false affidavits 
with no consequences and use the failure to vacate statute to circumvent 
other statutes designed to protect tenants’ rights, such as laws protecting 
tenants who are serving in the armed forces.23 The report discussed the une-
ven enforcement of the statute across the state, ranging from courts that 
simply refuse to hear failure to vacate cases, to courts that order tenants to 
leave despite no statutory authority to do so, to courts that do not impose the 
harshest penalties of the statute, to courts that may jail tenants.24 
The report contended that the statute violates the obligations of the 
United States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights25 in several different ways: 1) by interfering with the protection of the 
home through the risk of arbitrary eviction, 2) by the denying due process 
and abusing of criminal law, 3) by risking arbitrary detention, and 4) by 
risking imprisonment through failure to fulfill a contractual obligation.26 
These violations are cold comfort to tenants, however, because the United 
States Senate’s consent to the Covenant was subject to its declaration that 
Articles 1 through 27, which includes the articles argued to be violated by 
Arkansas law, were not self-executing.27 In other words, they cannot be 
grounds for litigation in United States courts without implementing legisla-
tion—which has not been enacted.28 
This article will first discuss the history of the failure to vacate statute, 
its treatment by commentators and courts, and its current very uneven en-
forcement across Arkansas. The article concurs with Professor Goforth’s 
 
/default/files/reports/us0113arkansas_reportcover_web.pdf (last visited July 23, 2012) [here-
inafter PAY THE RENT]. 
 22. Id. at 1–2. 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. Id. at 3–4. 
 25. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a multilateral treaty, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, that went into force in 1976. Par-
ties agree to respect individuals’ civil and political rights, including among others the right to 
life, freedom from torture and slavery, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, electoral rights, and rights to due process and a fair trial. International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976). 
 26. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 35–39. 
 27. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 347–48 (1995). 
 28. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992). 
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verdict of the unconstitutionality of the statute, argues additional grounds on 
which it is unconstitutional, and recommends its repeal. It also recommends 
amendment of either the unlawful detainer statute or the recently enacted 
“civil eviction” statute to improve summary eviction procedures, and rec-
ommends approval of district court jurisdiction over such procedures by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court. 
Next, the article will briefly consider the current state of the implied 
warranty of habitability nationwide, review the attempts to introduce it here, 
propose a statutory implied warranty for Arkansas, and in the alternative of 
legislative adoption, argue for judicial adoption of a warranty by the Su-
preme Court. 
II. THE FAILURE TO VACATE STATUTE—ARKANSAS’S “LOAN OF ITS 
HANDS” TO LANDLORDS29 
A. History 
The statute that is currently codified as section 18-16-101 of the Ar-
kansas Code, Annotated, was enacted in 1901. Its sponsor was Senator Ja-
cob King, from Stone County. The bill was not without controversy. It was 
referred out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with a “Do Not Pass” rec-
ommendation.30 It passed the Senate by only one vote, 14 to 13,31 although it 
passed more comfortably in the House, 48 to 27.32 Governor Jeff Davis 
signed the act on April 24. No official legislative history is available, alt-
hough the Arkansas Gazette printed remarks from the floor debate in the 
Senate.33 
Senator King (Jacob) spoke in favor of the bill. He said it simply sought 
to give relief to landlords who were unable to eject tenants who would 
not pay their rent. 
Senator Dowdy opposed the bill. He said it was entirely one-sided. In his 
judgment, all in favor of the landlord, and amounted to nothing more nor 
less than to give the landlord the right to throw his tenant in jail if he 
 
 29. “In the present case the state has simply lent her hands to landlords by enacting this 
1901 statute.” Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 513, 774 S.W.2d 830, 837 (1989) (Purtle, J., 
dissenting). 
 30. ARK. S. JOURNAL, 33d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 77 (1901). At that time, legisla-
tive procedure differed from that of today, and a “Do Not Pass” recommendation would not 
kill a bill. 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. ARK. H. JOURNAL, 33d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 398 (1901). 
 33. South Carolina Dispensary Law - Similar Bill Introduced in the House; Thirty-Four 
New Bills In, ARK. GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 1901, at 3. 
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failed to pay the rent. He was opposed to criminal measures for settling 
matters already covered by civil statutes. 
Senator Short said the bill sought only to see that justice was done the 
landlord. The bill provided that if a tenant failed to carry out a contract, 
then the landlord was to give him ten days’ notice to vacate, and if the 
tenant continued to hold possession after notice to vacate was served he 
would be subject to fine from $1 to $25 and $10 per day for every day so 
holding possession thereafter. He did not think the act would work a 
hardship upon the tenant, but it would make him do right and act honest. 
Senator Dowdy said a case might occur when the tenant actually had a 
right to continue on the premises. He might have complied with his con-
tract which, in many cases, were verbal, and the landlord might insist 
that he had not so complied, serve notice on him to get out, and if he 
failed slap him in jail. If a poor man, to pay his fine and get back his lib-
erty the best way he could. 
Senator Lawrence also opposed the bill. He said it was simple class leg-
islation in favor of the landlord, no more, no less, and ought to be defeat-
ed. 
Senator Jacob King–The bill only provides for a fine and nothing is said 
about putting anybody in jail. 
Senator Lawrence–That is true, but we all know what is done to a poor 
man in this state who cannot pay his fine. He is sent to jail and com-
pelled to work it out. 
Senator Kirby also opposed the bill. He thought the county was coming 
to a great pass when a man could be arrested and put in jail for debt. He 
could not see that the bill amounted to anything else. It gave the landlord 
absolute power over his tenant in many instances, and he thought the bill 
ought to be defeated. 
Senator Jacob King closed the debate. He said that the act was needed in 
the country as well as in the towns. It was intended to compel men to 
come up to their contracts and prevent dishonesty along that line. He 
thought it a good law and he hoped the senate would pass the bill.34 
The reference to “working it out” by Senator Lawrence refers to the 
practice, endemic throughout the South during this period (and abolished in 
Arkansas in 1909), of convict leasing, whereby convicts were “leased” to 
private parties who would use them as virtual slaves in agricultural and in-
 
 34. Id. 
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dustrial capacities.35 Other than for that abolished practice, the same points 
could be argued against the statute today. 
Time has effected some changes, however. Today, at least in Pulaski 
County, the county that hears the most failure to vacate suits each year, it is 
no longer “poor men” who are most harmed by the statute, but black wom-
en.36 In 2012, 62% of failure to vacate affidavits filed in the Little Rock 
Criminal Court were against tenants who were black women.37 In fact, 
women comprised 71% of all defendant tenants in Little Rock, and 57% in 
Springdale.38 Also, today, instead of “working it out,” criminal offenders 
may be victimized by the imposition of “legal financial obligations” that can 
have serious and lasting effects on their functioning in society.39 
B. Other States—A Single Florida Precedent 
As noted above, no other state has such a law today. Even examining 
state law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, online 
searching has revealed no similar law in other southern states in force during 
the time period in which Arkansas enacted the failure to vacate statute.40 
Florida enacted a statute in 193341 (later repealed) that criminalized the 
act of holding over by a tenant. A holdover is a different act than that crimi-
nalized by the Arkansas statute; in a holdover, the tenant remains on the 
premises after the natural termination of the lease.42 In 1935, the Florida 
Supreme Court rendered the only appellate decision on this statute.43 A Dade 
County tenant had held over, and after being arrested, sued for a writ of ha-
 
 35. Arkansas ended the practice in 1909. Carl H. Moneyhon, Convict Lease System, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS HISTORY & CULTURE , http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net
/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=4153 (last updated Sept. 12, 2012); see generally 
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008). 
 36. See infra App. B. 
 37. See infra Appendix B for more statistics on failure to vacate defendants, affiants, 
and property owners. Throughout this article, tenants will be referred to in the female gender, 
and landlords in the male gender. 
 38. Infra App. B. 
 39. See infra text accompanying notes 134 through 140 for further discussion of nega-
tive consequences of LFOs. 
 40. Available statutory codes were searched on HeinOnline Session Laws (which also 
contains selected superseded statutory codes) between 1870 and 1940 for the states of Ala-
bama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri. 
 41. 1933 Fla. Laws ch. 16066, 422 (repealed by 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-330, 770). 
 42. “It shall be unlawful to hold possession of lands or houses by any lessee whose lease 
has expired . . . . Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than One 
Hundred Dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three months . . . .” 1933 Fla. Laws ch. 
16066, 422. 
 43. Coleman v. State ex rel. Carver, 161 So. 89 (Fla. 1935). 
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beas corpus, alleging that the statute was unconstitutional.44 The trial court 
agreed but failed to cite a specific section of the Florida or United States 
Constitution.45 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court, holding the stat-
ute constitutional.46 The court acknowledged the legislature’s power to crim-
inalize acts which formerly were merely civil wrongs.47 It noted that the 
statute applied only to tenants at sufferance, who had no contractual rights 
as their lease terms had already ended.48 The court responded to an argument 
that the statute benefitted landlords, rather than the public, by comparing 
holding over to trespass, stating that “[a]ll statutes against trespass are pri-
marily for the protection of the individual property owner, but they are also 
for the purpose of protecting society against breaches of the peace which 
might occur if the owner of the property is required to protect his rights by 
force of arms.”49 The reasoning as to the preference of a criminal statute to 
self-help would not be persuasive today in Arkansas, because Arkansas pro-
hibits self-help by landlords.50 
Justice Brown dissented, agreeing with the trial court that the statute 
was unconstitutional.51 He quoted from the trial court’s opinion that the act 
required no intent to commit a trespass or any other offense as a prerequisite 
for conviction.52 The trial judge believed the “real purpose, intent and effect 
of the Act is to assist lessors, at public expense, in regaining possession of 
premises under indentures of lease . . . .”53 The judge believed the law broke 
the “line of demarcation between civil wrongs or torts, and crimes.”54 The 
trial court’s opinion contained a quotation from Blackstone’s Commentaries 
that is still relevant to Arkansas today: 
[P]rivate wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the 
civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individu-
als; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and viola-
tion of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, consid-
ered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity. As, if I detain a 
field from another man, to which the law has given him a right, this is a 
civil injury, and not a crime; for here only the right of an individual is 
 
 44. Id. at 90. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 91. 
 49. Coleman, 161 So. at 92. 
 50. E.g., Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888 (1986). 
 51. Coleman, 161 So. at 92 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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concerned, and it is immaterial to the public which of us is in possession 
of the land.55 
Just as with Arkansas’s Senate’s debate in 1901 over the failure to va-
cate bill, these arguments against a similar statute are just as cogent today 
when applied to Arkansas. Meanwhile, landlord-tenant law nationally has 
moved significantly in the direction of increased rights for tenants, causing 
Arkansas to lag even further behind. The following section will explain the 
current failure to vacate law in Arkansas—what is on the books versus what 
actually happens in courts throughout the state. 
C. Current Law and Enforcement 
Serving on the Landlord-Tenant Study Commission and hearing Com-
missioners’ comments about the unequal enforcement of the failure to va-
cate statute piqued the author’s interest in the enforcement of the failure to 
vacate statute across Arkansas. From December 2012 to January 2013, sev-
eral of the author’s students visited district courts in some of Arkansas’s 
most populous cities and towns and asked for statistics on how failure to 
vacate cases were handled. This narrow investigation revealed that enforce-
ment was wildly uneven. 
In the summer of 2013, the author and her research assistants contacted 
each Arkansas district court with several questions: the approximate number 
of failure to vacate cases each year, the typical outcome of such cases, and 
whether tenants were ever fined, jailed, ordered to pay restitution, or ordered 
to leave the premises. The author was able to obtain a year’s worth of failure 
to vacate affidavits from both the Springdale District Court and the Little 
Rock District Court,56 as well as examine several from a few other district 
courts. Additionally, the author met and corresponded with Legal Services 
attorneys, the attorneys who most often represent those few tenants who 
obtain counsel, to discuss how enforcement of the failure to vacate statute 
actually plays out in court. The results of this research confirm extremely 
uneven enforcement of the statute statewide, occasionally even within par-
ticular counties, and general overall deviation from the text of the statute. 
1. No Enforcement 
To begin with, not all district courts hear failure to vacate cases. The 
total number of courts called was 233. Of those, sixty-seven courts (29%) 
refuse to hear failure to vacate cases.57 In eighteen counties (24%), this is a 
 
 55. Id. at 92 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5). 
 56. Affidavits on file with author. 
 57. Infra App. A. 
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county-wide ban. In ten counties, district courts seem to have reached inde-
pendent, opposing decisions about whether to hear such cases. A total of 
forty district courts do not hear failure to vacate cases because they refer 
them to other, typically larger, courts within the same county.58 Eight courts 
responded that they heard traffic cases only. The decision not to hear failure 
to vacate cases may be made by the judge, the prosecutor, or both.  
2. Some Background Statistics 
Using the most conservative number estimates provided, over 2,000 
failure to vacate cases are filed in Arkansas each year.59 Per county, the 
number of annual cases in those counties that hear such cases ranged from 
fewer than one, in eight courts, to almost 500 in Little Rock.60 The courts 
hearing the most cases, in descending order, are Little Rock, Texarkana, Hot 
Springs, North Little Rock, and Springdale.61 
As noted in Appendix B, the statute impacts women (and presumably 
children) more so than men, as they are the majority sex prosecuted, both in 
Little Rock and in Springdale, but more so in Little Rock (71%) than in 
Springdale (57%).62 Only twenty-four of the 396 Little Rock affidavits were 
filed against cohabiting tenants who had cosigned their leases; the others 
were filed against tenants signing singly. 
A tally of landlords using the failure to vacate statute in Little Rock re-
vealed that the 396 affidavits filed during 2012 were filed by individuals 
representing only 168 real estate owners. Some have theorized that only 
“mom and pop” landlords, those operating on a thin margin and unable to 
afford an attorney, are the chief users of the statute, but the addresses of the 
tenants and these statistics reveal that many landlords of multiple-unit rental 
housing regularly rely on the statute. One LLC filed failure to vacate charg-
es against sixteen tenants during a one-year period. Several filed more than 
ten affidavits in the one-year period. 
3. Notice and Arraignment 
Section 18-16-101 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, was last amended 
in 2001.63 In its current form, the statute first states that a tenant who fails to 
 
 58. These were counted as courts that heard failure to vacate cases. 
 59. See infra Appendix A, containing a conservative estimate, from figures provided, of 
approximately 2,150 failure to vacate cases every year. 
 60. Little Rock heard 475 cases in 2012. Three hundred and ninety-six affidavits were 
filed (affidavits on file with author). 
 61. See infra App. A. 
 62. Infra App. B. 
 63. The statute’s current form is as follows: 
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pay rent when it is due forfeits all right to occupy the premises.64 Some 
states allow for the late payment of rent under some circumstances.65 Arkan-
sas, under the failure to vacate statute, does not. Therefore, once rent has not 
been paid, the landlord (or landlord’s agent or attorney) can give written 
notice, and if the tenant is still on the premises later than ten days following 
the giving of notice, the tenant is “guilty of a misdemeanor”66 and may be 
fined $25 per day.67 Prior to the last amendments in 2001, the amount of the 
 
(a) Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or any land 
situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to pay the rent 
therefor when due according to contract shall at once forfeit all right to longer 
occupy the dwelling house or other building or land. 
(b)(1) If, after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given by the land-
lord or the landlord’s agent or attorney to the tenant to vacate the dwelling house 
or other building or land, the tenant shall willfully refuse to vacate and surrender 
the possession of the premises to the landlord or the landlord’s agent or attorney, 
the tenant shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) Upon conviction before any justice of the peace or other court of competent 
jurisdiction in the county where the premises are situated, the tenant shall be 
fined twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day for each day that the tenant fails to va-
cate the premises. 
(c)(1) Any tenant charged with refusal to vacate upon notice who enters a plea of 
not guilty to the charge of refusal to vacate upon notice and who continues to in-
habit the premises after notice to vacate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section 
shall be required to deposit into the registry of the court a sum equal to the 
amount of rent due on the premises. The rental payments shall continue to be 
paid into the registry of the court during the pendency of the proceedings in ac-
cordance with the rental agreement between the landlord and the tenant, whether 
the agreement is written or oral. 
(2)(A) If the tenant is found not guilty of refusal to vacate upon notice, the rental 
payments shall be returned to the tenant. 
(B) If the tenant is found guilty of refusal to vacate upon notice, the rental pay-
ment paid into the registry of the court shall be paid over to the landlord by the 
court clerk. 
(3) Any tenant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is found guilty of re-
fusal to vacate upon notice and has not paid the required rental payments into the 
registry of the court shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2003). 
 64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(a) (Repl. 2003). 
 65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-461 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ALASKA STAT. § 
09.45.090 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.660(2) (LexisNexis 2002) (tenant has within 
seven days of receiving nonpayment and intent to terminate notice from landlord to pay the 
rent). Seven days is a common period, as is three days. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 
562A.27(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2013). In fact, in Oregon, a landlord may not even deliver a 
notice of nonpayment and intent to terminate until the rent is five days late. OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 90.394(2)(b) (West 2010). 
 66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(b)(1) (Repl. 2003). 
 67. Id. § 18-16-101(b)(2) (Repl. 2003). 
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daily fine was discretionary, between $1 and $25 per day.68 The 2001 
amendments raised it to a flat $25 per day. 
Thus, even if the rent is one day late, by law the tenant has forfeited the 
remainder of the leasehold term, no matter how long, and on that day the 
landlord can post the notice and begin the failure to vacate procedure. Some 
landlords allegedly refuse to accept timely rent payments from tenants so 
they can use the failure to vacate statute to evict them.69 In a documented 
abuse of the procedure, one landlord crossed out the “10” in the ten-day 
notice, wrote in “3,” and proceeded to the arraignment stage.70 
If at the end of the ten days the tenant has not vacated, the landlord typ-
ically files the ten-day notice and an affidavit (some courts also require a 
copy of the lease) with the appropriate authority—the police, sheriff, prose-
cuting attorney, or city attorney. Some of the courts handling large volumes 
of failure to vacate cases have form failure to vacate affidavits, setting out 
statutory elements, so that the landlord need only sign. Other, smaller courts 
are more likely to use generalized forms. It is questionable as to how many 
failure to vacate cases are investigated and not merely “rubber stamped” by 
prosecutors or city attorneys before being presented for the judge’s signature 
on the warrant or summons. 
 
 68. The statute was greatly expanded in 2001. Prior to that year, Ark. Code Ann. section 
18-16-101 read as follows: 
(a) Any person who shall rent any dwelling house or other building or any land 
situated in the State of Arkansas and who shall refuse or fail to pay the rent 
therefor when due according to contract shall at once forfeit all right to longer 
occupy the dwelling house or other building or land. 
(b) If, after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given by the landlord 
or his agent or attorney to the tenant to vacate the dwelling house or other build-
ing or land, the tenant shall willfully refuse to vacate and surrender the posses-
sion of the premises to the landlord or his agent or his attorney, the tenant shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction before any justice of the peace or 
other court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the premises are situat-
ed, the tenant shall be fined in any sum not less than one dollar ($1.00) nor more 
than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each offense. Each day the tenant shall will-
fully and unnecessarily hold the dwelling house or other building or land after 
the expiration of notice to vacate shall constitute a separate offense. 
Id. § 18-16-101. The 2001 amendments changed the fine, required the restitutionary payment 
of alleged rent due to the court and subsequently the landlord, and made a conviction without 
the restitutionary payment a Class B misdemeanor. 
 69. Interview with Dustin Duke, Managing Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, and 
Stacy Fletcher, Staff Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter 
Duke & Fletcher Interview]. Their advice to tenants in this situation is to take a witness when 
attempting to pay the rent, so that the witness can later testify in court. Id. 
 70. Id. The judge dismissed the case at the arraignment. Email from Dustin Duke, Man-
aging Attorney, Ctr. for Ark. Legal Services, to Lynn Foster, Ark. Bar Foundation Professor, 
UALR William H. Bowen School of Law (Aug. 15, 2013, 00:00 CST) (on file with author). 
See also PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 33, for an account of the incident. 
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The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does 
not permit public housing or Section 8 landlords71 to use the failure to vacate 
statute.72 One of the Arkansas district courts hearing the most failure to va-
cate cases requires the landlord or agent to swear that the landlord is not 
receiving any rental assistance from an agency such as HUD on behalf of 
the tenant. Affidavits from a few other courts around the state that were ex-
amined did not contain such a provision, raising the question of whether 
HUD’s directive may freely be ignored without enforcement in some quar-
ters.73 
The court handling the largest volume of failure to vacate cases re-
quires a witness both to view the posting of the ten-day notice and to sign 
the notice. The affidavit the landlord must file asks for a witness’s name and 
signature, yet of hundreds of affidavits from that court examined by the au-
thor not a single one was signed by a witness.74 In other courts, on the other 
hand, no witness is necessary. One affidavit examined by the author stated 
as facts constituting reasonable cause “failure to vacate” and no more.75   
Certainly most landlords fill out the affidavits truthfully. However, 
there is often no independent check at this stage if a landlord does not. The 
Human Rights Watch report documented one case where the “tenant” was 
actually a purchaser, but nonetheless, the “landlord” repeatedly filed affida-
vits, which were repeatedly sent on to law enforcement officials, resulting in 
the tenant being required to appear in court.76 In 2013, a similar case arose in 
northeast Arkansas in which a seller filed a failure to vacate charge against a 
purchaser under a contract for deed.77 A tenant personally observed by the 
author in the Little Rock Criminal Court Clerk’s Office stated that she paid 
her rent promptly but had reported her landlord to Code Enforcement be-
cause her ceiling fell in and damaged her personal property. She alleged that 
he was retaliating by posting a ten-day notice. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that a number of rent payment disputes arise over repairs, which is not sur-
prising because Arkansas has no implied warranty of habitability. Landlords 
who have not covenanted to do so need not make any repairs, unless the 
premises are in such bad condition that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is 
breached, in which case a tenant must move out in order to sue, and the only 
 
 71. Section 8 landlords are those that rent to tenants who find their own housing and 
receive payment assistance by voucher from the federal government. Landlords, HUD.GOV, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/groups/landlords (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 141 through 145 for a discussion of HUD’s di-
rective. 
 73. Affidavits on file with author. 
 74. Affidavits on file with author. 
 75. Affidavits on file with author. 
 76. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 3, 25–26. 
 77. Suit Against Blackman Dropped, JONESBORO SUN, Oct. 22, 2013. The judge dis-
missed the case. 
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remedy is termination of the lease and not repair. A common sequence of 
events is that a tenant and a landlord will disagree over repairs, and the land-
lord will force the tenant out, often using the failure to vacate statute, and 
rent to someone else. In at least a few district courts, it seems landlords’ 
allegations are taken as fact without investigation, much less application of 
the presumption that the tenant is innocent of a crime. 
On approval of a warrant or summons by a district court judge, tenants 
are served by the police or sheriff, and may be arrested if there are other 
outstanding warrants. Some courts require tenants to make bond prior to any 
arraignment, and tenants may be jailed if they cannot make bond.78 Tenants 
must appear for a criminal arraignment.79 Most persons would agree that this 
procedure creates more of a stigma for the tenant than notice of a civil law-
suit, even if served by a process server.80 Often, tenants do not understand 
the full legal implications of a ten-day notice. Many are frightened and 
ashamed when served with a warrant or summons. The mere fact of criminal 
prosecution no doubt discourages some innocent tenants and causes them to 
leave the premises, rather than face the ordeal of posting bond or appearing 
for arraignment, especially if they have already been in the criminal justice 
system or are in it during their tenancy. 
The “willfulness” requirement of the statute has been interpreted by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court as “willfully refusing to remove therefrom with 
the necessary criminal intent to deprive the rightful owner of his property.”81 
But typically the questions the judge asks the tenant are simply whether the 
tenant is on the premises and whether the tenant paid the rent on time.82 And 
so the tenant who is late because of a personal crisis or a good-faith misun-
derstanding with the landlord is just as guilty under the law as one who de-
liberately does not pay.83 As the dissenting judge in Coleman argued with 
respect to the Florida statute, a tenant could remain on the premises because 
of the illness of himself or a family member, or because of an “honest mis-
take.”84 
 
 78. See Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69. 
 79. Arkansas district court have jurisdiction to hear misdemeanors concurrent with cir-
cuit courts. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 7. It is conceivable that a circuit court could conduct 
the procedure but the author was unable to find any such instances. 
 80. See PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 22, for the account of a tenant who was served 
a criminal summons at her job as a cashier. 
 81. Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 285, 772 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1989) (quoting Poole v. 
State, 244 Ark. 1222, 1226, 428 S.W.2d 628, 630 (1968)). 
 82. See Interview with Alice Lightle, Little Rock Criminal Court Judge (Dec. 5, 2012); 
PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 20–21; Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69. 
 83. PAY THE RENT, supra note 21, at 2. 
 84. Coleman v. State ex rel. Carver, 161 So. 89, 93–94 (Fla. 1935) (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). 
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4. Payment of Alleged Rent Due 
If a tenant pleads not guilty and remains on the premises, the 2001 
amendments to the statute require the tenant to deposit the sum the landlord 
alleges is due for rent.85 In other words, in this criminal proceeding, a de-
fendant who pleads not guilty must pay a sum alleged due by a third party, 
without any investigation of the veracity of the allegation, prior to any trial. 
During the pendency of the proceedings, the tenant must continue to pay 
rent “into the registry of the court.”86 The statute does not expressly state 
that if the tenant fails to pay there will be no trial, but that is the clear impli-
cation—“[a]ny tenant charged with refusal to vacate upon notice who enters 
a plea of not guilty to the charge of refusal to vacate upon notice and who 
continues to inhabit the premises after notice to vacate pursuant to subsec-
tion (b) of this section shall be required to deposit into the registry of the 
court a sum equal to the amount of rent due on the premises.”87 
If the tenant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the tenant is guilty of a 
Class B misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $1,000 or ninety days in 
jail, unless the tenant pays over to the landlord the amount the landlord stat-
ed was due on the affidavit, including any accrued rent.88 Requiring a crimi-
nal defendant who pleads “not guilty” to pay a sum into court is unheard of 
in criminal law and is tantamount to a presumption that the defendant is 
guilty. This is the most egregious feature of the statute.89 
Professor Goforth likened this “up front” requirement to pay rent alleg-
edly owed to the bond required when a court sets bail.90 However, as she 
noted, this analogy fails because bail is a discretionary amount not imposed 
in all circumstances, and only imposed to protect society.91 Additionally, the 
court, and not the victim, retains forfeited bail.92 Finally, a criminal defend-
ant does not lose the right to trial through failure to make bail.93 She cites a 
 
 85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003). This seems to be a weird borrow-
ing of the bond required in some states if a tenant, in an eviction proceeding, wishes to stay 
on the premises pending a full hearing. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-311 (2010) (tenant 
who asks for continuance of more than two days in unlawful detainer proceeding must give 
sufficient security); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.12.100 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014) (tenant 
to pay bond in order to stay enforcement of writ of restitution); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 799.44 
(West 1981) (tenant may be required to pay bond in order to stay enforcement of writ of 
restitution). 
 86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3). 
 89. See infra text accompanying notes 146 through 149 for analysis of the constitution-
ality of this requirement. 
 90. Goforth, supra note 11, at 28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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2002 Springdale case in which the tenant defendant was jailed after pleading 
not guilty because he could not pay the “bond” of $425. 
The potential consequences of this would have been staggering if this 
had been a civil proceeding, as we would normally expect both parties to 
have equal access to the courts rather than conditioning a defendant’s ac-
cess to a pre-hearing deposit. In this case, the process was even more 
outrageous, as the defendant’s right to defend against a criminal prosecu-
tion appears to have been conditioned on his payment into court amounts 
that had not at that time been proven to be owing, but were merely 
claimed to be due.94 
The foregoing scenario described is still possible in several courts 
across the state, some of which handle significant numbers of cases. How-
ever, most district courts do not follow this provision of the statute. Most 
courts (58%) do not ever require tenants to pay back rent, either before or 
after sentencing. Court after court stated that if landlords wanted rent, they 
must sue in small claims court. A comment repeatedly heard was that the 
failure to vacate statute is “just to get tenants out.” The civil unlawful de-
tainer statute addresses these problems of the landlord—both the need to 
evict the tenant and the right to back rent. However, many residential land-
lords simply do not avail themselves of the unlawful detainer statute.95 
In some courts, the alleged rent payment and fine operate as a lever to 
get tenants out. Tenants are told that if they move out, they will not have to 
pay either a fine or the amount the landlord is requesting. The innocent or 
good-faith tenant, who may have little money or who may be tired of asking 
unsuccessfully for repairs over several months, and who probably is not 
represented by an attorney, will move out rather than try to defend herself. 
Often in breach of the lease in the first place because of an economic set-
back, tenants must pay even more for a trial. This aspect of the statute effec-
tively reverses any presumption of innocence; in essence, tenants are pre-
sumed guilty. 
A feature of the statute more akin to civil than to criminal proceedings 
is the ultimate disposition of the payment of alleged rent, which a few courts 
do collect. In a typical criminal trial, the fine paid goes to the state. The fail-
ure to vacate statute, however, characterizes the payment not as a fine but as 
the “sum equal to the amount of rent due.”96 The court does not keep this 
sum. If the tenant is found not guilty, the tenant receives it back from the 
 
 94. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
 95. See infra text accompanying note 201 for landlords’ objections to the unlawful de-
tainer statute. 
 96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(c)(1) (Repl. 2003). 
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court. Otherwise, the court pays it to the landlord, like damages in an evic-
tion or tort proceeding.97 
One can argue that the alleged rent is restitution. Restitution is not an 
aspect of classic criminal law sentencing,98 but recent trends in the last sev-
eral decades have popularized it as a form of “restorative justice.”99 Various 
federal and state statutes now authorize restitution in certain contexts. Sec-
tion 5-4-205 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, authorizes the payment of 
restitution by a defendant convicted of an offense. However, under this stat-
ute restitution is not mandatory; its imposition rests in the discretion of the 
court.100 If restitution is to be ordered for an offense not causing bodily harm 
to the victim, the amount of restitution is “a factual question to be decided 
by the preponderance of the evidence presented to the sentencing authority 
during the sentencing phase of a trial.”101 The failure to vacate statute, how-
ever, requires restitution in all cases except where the defendant is found not 
guilty.102 Further, failure to deposit the alleged restitutionary amount results 
in a step-up in the crime classification, from an unclassified to a Class B 
misdemeanor, which raises the possibility of a sentence of a fine up to 
$1,000 and imprisonment up to ninety days.103 
Section 5-4-205 of the Arkansas Code, Annotated, allows a defendant 
to pay restitution, if it is ordered, within a period of time, or in specified 
installments. The statute lists factors for the court to take into account when 
considering whether to allow restitution payment to be delayed: 1) the de-
fendant’s financial resources and the burden restitution will impose; 2) the 
ability of the defendant to pay by installment; and 3) the rehabilitative effect 
payment will have on the defendant.104 Again, the failure to vacate statute is 
not so finely nuanced. The defendant, who has just lost her place of resi-
dence, in many cases because she has suffered a drop in income or encoun-
tered unexpected expenses of another type, must pay the alleged amount of 
rent due or risk jail or a substantial fine, regardless of any of these factors. 
The failure to vacate statute seems to contradict section 5-4-205. 
Another problem with the requirement of payment of this sum into “the 
registry of the court” is that district courts do not have registries. Thus, in a 
recent case involving a tenant who pled not guilty, the tenant was unable to 
 
 97. Id. at § 18-16-101(c)(2)(B). 
 98. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(b) (2d ed. 2003). 
 99. Id. § 1.5(a)(7). 
 100. “A defendant who is found guilty or who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
to an offense may be ordered to pay restitution.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(a)(1) (Repl. 
2013) (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. § 5-4-205(b)(4)(A). 
 102. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(2)(A) (Repl. 2003). 
 103. See id. § 18-16-101(c)(3). 
 104. Id. § 5-4-205(e)(2). 
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pay into the nonexistent registry. Yet nonpayment means a stiffer sentence 
and worse offense, so the Legal Services attorneys explained their dilemma 
to the prosecutor, who advised them to give him notice of the payments, but 
to pay them to the landlord.105 
5. Outcomes 
Under the statute, if the tenant is found not guilty, the deposited funds 
are returned to the tenant, and the lease term carries on as before. If the ten-
ant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty, the tenant is guilty of 
an unclassified misdemeanor,106 with a potential penalty of $25 per day of 
violation.107 On the other hand, if the tenant has not paid the alleged rent 
due, the classification of the crime is increased to a Class B misdemeanor, 
with a sentence of a fine up to $1,000 and imprisonment for ninety days.108 
Real-life outcomes in the courts are more varied. Some district courts 
do impose the $25 per day fine.109 Others impose a flat fine, regardless of 
how many days over the tenant has stayed.110 Some do not impose a fine, as 
long as the tenant moves out within a reasonable time.111 As Appendix A 
indicates, one notable deviation from the statute is the practice of at least 
seven courts to order tenants to leave, even though the statute does not au-
thorize such a power.112 
In 2004 the Arkansas Attorney General was asked whether under the 
failure to vacate statute a judge could force tenants to leave. The answer was 
no.113 Either ejectment or the unlawful detainer statute must be used to force 
tenants out, and the legal mechanism is a writ of possession.114 Nonetheless, 
research reveals that some district courts do order tenants to leave premises 
in failure to vacate arraignments and trials. 
Although researchers were told that at least one court threatens tenants 
with jail if the tenant does not move out, Appendix A seems to reveal that in 
practice, actually jailing tenants for failure to vacate rarely happens. How-
ever, a tenant who stays beyond the ten days (and tenants convinced of their 
innocence are more likely to stay) risks a fine, depending on the court and 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-107(c)(2) (Repl. 2013). 
 107. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3) (Repl. 2003). 
 108. Id. § 18-16-101(c)(3); id. § 5-4-201; id. § 5-4-401 (Supp. 2010). 
 109. See infra App. A. 
 110. See infra App. A. 
 111. See infra App. A. 
 112. See infra App. A. 
 113. Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-148 (June 14, 2004). 
 114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-208 (Repl. 2003); id. § 18-60-309 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 
2013). 
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the judge. Tenants who are fined and cannot pay the fine risk jail time, in all 
courts. No doubt this is a powerful impetus to force innocent tenants out. 
Landlords told Commissioners that most tenants in unlawful detainer 
actions simply fail to reply to the complaint, and thus the landlord can simp-
ly obtain a writ of possession at the initial hearing stage.115 Landlords may 
decide to pursue a judgment as well, for unpaid rent, fees, and costs, and any 
damages.116 The landlord then becomes a judgment creditor of the tenant. 
The same behavior in a criminal proceeding is far more serious, how-
ever. A tenant who does not appear at arraignment will probably be charged 
with failure to appear. Courts differed in their practice here as well, with 
some courts dismissing charges if the tenant had vacated the premises prior 
to the arraignment, and others requiring the tenant to appear even if she had 
already moved out. In cases where the tenant is required to appear and does 
not, failure to appear is a crime, and typically the judge will issue a bench 
warrant. Sooner or later the defendant will be stopped by the police, the fail-
ure to appear warrant will appear in the police data base, and the tenant will 
be arrested and possibly jailed. 
D. Failure to Vacate Criminalization and Public Policy 
An Arkansas landlord whose tenant is in possession of the premises 
without paying rent may sue in court under one or more of the civil claims 
of unlawful detainer or ejectment. However, many residential landlords in 
Arkansas do not file a civil action to remove a tenant. Why should they? 
There is little incentive for a landlord to retain an attorney, pay filing fees, 
and use a civil statute when for no charge at all he can file an affidavit with 
a prosecutor or city attorney, use that prosecutor in lieu of an attorney, avoid 
any counterclaims against himself, and much less expensively remove a 
tenant from his premises. Does public policy support such a unique and un-
balanced approach to landlord tenant law? 
Again and again, researchers heard the opinion expressed by court per-
sonnel that the failure to vacate statute is the “only way” to remove a tenant 
from the premises, and that to obtain back rent landlords “must” sue in small 
claims court, as though the unlawful detainer statute simply did not exist. Is 
there something special about Arkansas that justifies criminalizing nonpay-
ment of rent while occupying the rental premises, and “lending the govern-
ment hands” to landlords? To attempt to answer this question it is useful to 
examine why certain behavior is made criminal by the government. A crime 
is behavior, comprised of contemporaneous intent and act, that 1) causes 
harm, 2) is forbidden by statute, and 3) is subject to predictable, statutory 
 
 115. Id. § 18-60-307 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
 116. Id. § 18-60-309 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
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punishment.117 The purpose of the criminal law is to prevent harm to the 
public.118 Harm to the public, and not to individuals, is the hallmark of a 
crime. “[T]he state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public 
interest but not to compensate the victim . . . .”119 Certain acts are crimes, 
rather than private wrongs, because they harm “the unity and the security of 
the community that we share.”120 The criminal law punishes the offender for 
his harm to society, not to the victim.121 
Criminal law uses different evidentiary standards than civil law be-
cause “it puts a higher value on certainty before imposing sanctions.”122 
Commission of a crime results in different consequences than commission 
of a civil wrong such as the breach of a contract. Whereas a civil wrongdoer 
may be sued by a private plaintiff and be enjoined or have to pay damages 
and face some moral opprobrium, a criminal wrongdoer may be arrested, 
jailed, prosecuted by the government, and be fined, imprisoned, or even 
executed. In general, criminal law imposes more drastic penalties than does 
civil law.123 In general, society morally condemns the criminal more strong-
ly than it does the civil wrongdoer.124 Crimes embody the concept of being 
morally worse than civil wrongs, involving “real evil” rather than mere care-
lessness.125 
Analyzing the failure to vacate statute with respect to the underlying 
policy of the criminal law, harm to the public, it is difficult to see how the 
unity and security of the community is threatened more by tenants remain-
ing on premises and not paying rent than by some other comparable groups, 
such as homeowners defaulting on promissory notes secured by mortgages. 
In general, state law criminalizes neither the breach of a contract between 
two private parties, the breach of covenants connected with the transfer of 
an interest in real property, nor the failure to pay a debt. 
Imagine for a moment a statute that criminalizes the mother who buys a 
refrigerator at Sears on credit, cannot make all the payments, and doesn’t 
return the appliance. Imagine another statute that criminalizes a subdivision 
resident who installs a clothesline in the back yard, in violation of a restric-
tive covenant. Imagine a third statute that criminalizes the husband and wife 
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who default on their mortgage payment and remain in occupation of the 
premises. How much easier it would be for the creditor holding a security 
interest in the property to simply give the couple ten days to leave, after they 
have been in default for several months! The creditor could forego the ser-
vices of an attorney and head to the prosecutor’s office to fill out an affida-
vit once the ten days had passed. Instead of nervously checking the mail for 
notices, defaulting homeowners could instead wait for the knock of the po-
lice at their doors. No statute in any state criminalizes such defaults. Civil 
courts exist to remedy private wrongs, such as breach of contracts or cove-
nants or default on a note secured by a mortgage, which are the closest legal 
analogies to default on a lease. 
“Victim compensation” or “restitution” to the landlord (payment of the 
alleged rent owed) is virtually mandatory under the Arkansas statute, as 
though it is a strange hybrid of civil and criminal law. Although few if any 
courts interpret it this way, it reads as though failure to pay the alleged 
amount of rent due into the court deprives the tenant of a trial, because pay-
ment is a prerequisite. More courts do follow the portion of the statute that 
convicts the tenant of a more serious crime (a Class B misdemeanor as op-
posed to an unclassified misdemeanor) if the alleged amount of rent due has 
not been deposited. Nonetheless, as Appendix A shows, few courts require 
the deposits. 
As Professor Goforth pointed out ten years ago, the failure to vacate 
statute unfairly “single[s] out landlords for the special and unique privilege 
to having debts which they claim as due and owing enforced at the expense 
of taxpayers through the criminal justice system.”126 No other state places 
landlords in this category, and no other Arkansas statute allows creditors to 
use the criminal justice system to collect their debts. The closest analogy in 
Arkansas law was struck down as unconstitutional in 1991.127 
What justifies giving landlords this powerful and arguably unfair ad-
vantage? The Arkansas Supreme Court was sympathetic to the landlord’s 
arguments in support of the failure to vacate statute in Poole v. State, decid-
ed in 1968, declaring that the tenant in that case “does not base her contin-
ued possession upon any claim of right whatever, except a right to force the 
owner to the expense of bond, attorney’s fees, and irrecoverable court costs 
in civil litigation.”128 The court viewed tenants occupying the premises dur-
ing their lease term but late with the rent as “criminal trespassers.”129 Under 
common law, however, as noted above, a tenant late with the rent during the 
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lease term was not viewed as a trespasser because of the doctrine of inde-
pendent covenants; a landlord was limited to the remedy of suing for the 
rent.130 If a lease is still in force, it is legally impossible for a tenant to be a 
trespasser. Prior to the enactment of the failure to vacate statute, a landlord 
would have to sue in unlawful detainer or ejectment to evict a tenant who 
stopped paying rent during the term of the lease. In fact, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court later clarified that a tenant prosecuted under Arkansas Code, 
Annotated, section 18-16-101 could not be prosecuted for criminal tres-
pass.131 One feature of section 18-16-101 that changes the common law, 
however, is the provision that causes forfeiture of the tenant’s interest upon 
nonpayment of the rent.132 In other words, once the day on which rent is due 
ends, under section 18-16-101, the tenant who has not paid no longer pos-
sesses a leasehold; it has been forfeited by operation of law. 
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in 
Munson v. Gilliam, stated as dictum that the conclusion “[t]hat a tenant who 
fails, without justification, to pay rent is in effect stealing property from the 
landlord and should be criminally punished, is a conclusion available to a 
state under the Constitution.”133 No other state, however, has reached this 
conclusion. 
Another public policy to consider is whether this law unfairly burdens 
the poor. Unpaid rent, court costs, and fines fall within the category of un-
paid criminal justice debt, or “legal financial obligations” (LFOs): “all fines, 
fees and costs associated with a criminal sentence.”134 LFOs may have the 
effect of injuring defendants’ incomes, credit ratings, prospects for employ-
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ment and housing, and even freedom, if they are jailed. LFOs may “ensnare” 
defendants in the criminal justice system.135 They have a disproportionate 
effect on the poor. LFOs are a modern type of debtors’ prison, and arguably 
the failure to vacate statute contributes to a host of factors that may capsize 
a poor tenant’s life.136 
High LFOs may violate the United States Constitution, as the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in 1983 in Bearden v. Georgia.137 In that case, 
Bearden pled guilty to burglary and theft by receiving, and was sentenced to 
probation and a $750 fine.138 He borrowed money to pay the first install-
ments, but lost his job and was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder 
of his probationary sentence, despite the fact that he had engaged in a good-
faith effort to find a job.139 The Court held that if probationers could not pay 
their fines, despite bona fide efforts to do so, courts must consider alternate 
means of punishment, other than prison.140 
Somewhat ironically, the poorest of the poor Arkansans, who are most 
likely living in public or Section 8 housing, are not subject to Arkansas 
Code, Annotated, section 18-16-101, because HUD has prohibited housing 
authorities and Section 8 landlords from using it.141 Federal regulations re-
quire such landlords to evict tenants only by “judicial action pursuant to 
State or local law.”142 In 1978, a Pine Bluff Legal Aid attorney raised the 
issue of whether the failure to vacate statute complied with this regulation. 
HUD opined that the failure to vacate statute was not “judicial action for 
eviction.”143 Instead, it was “merely a criminal statute that is utilized to force 
a tenant to vacate property under threat of fine. No reference at any point in 
the statute is made to eviction.”144A 1981 letter from HUD to landlords 
listed the programs to which this directive applied: low-rent public housing, 
Section 8 existing housing, Section 8 new and substantial rehabilitation 
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housing, Sections 202, 221(d)(3) or (5) below market interest rate housing, 
Section 236 interest reduction, and rent supplement housing.145 
The policy still stands; HUD has not since granted permission to feder-
ally subsidized landlords and housing authorities to use the failure to vacate 
statute to evict tenants. A question worth asking, however, is whether it is 
being enforced. During the writing of this article, the author was informed 
that a housing authority in northeast Arkansas is using the failure to vacate 
statute to evict tenants. If prosecutors do not inquire and tenants are unrepre-
sented by counsel, there may well be violation of the federal regulations. 
E. Unconstitutionality 
As one commenter has pointed out, the failure to vacate statute violates 
constitutional due process, but that is not where the constitutional concerns 
ends.146 This section outlines the statute’s other constitutional deficiencies, 
including arguable violation of the prohibition of imprisonment for debt, 
disproportional punishment, and lack of the presumption of innocence. 
1. Due Process 
Federal and state constitutions limit legislatures’ powers to create 
crimes. Professor Goforth ably detailed several constitutional deficiencies of 
the failure to vacate statute in her article. Briefly, she argued first a violation 
of due process because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that debt-
ors must receive a hearing prior to depriving the debtor of property and the 
Arkansas statute requires tenants overstaying the ten-day notice period to 
“post bond” in an amount alleged by a third party, prior to a hearing.147 In 
other words, a criminal procedure mandates a pre-hearing payment that is 
similar to an illegal civil pre-hearing attachment by a creditor. 
Second, she argued that there is a second violation of due process be-
cause of the requirement that a tenant “who wishes to enter a ‘not guilty’ 
plea to the criminal charge of ‘failure to vacate’ must pay the full amount of 
allegedly due rent into court.”148 This payment requirement, obviously, in-
terferes with the due process right to a fair trial. In essence, the tenant must 
pay to plead not guilty. Both of these statutory provisions remain in effect 
today. 
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The Arkansas Constitution states that “[e]very person is entitled to a 
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his 
person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without 
purchase; completely, and without denial; promptly and without delay; con-
formably to the laws.”149 Those tenants unjustly accused under the failure to 
vacate statute must “purchase their justice” in some courts by posting the 
alleged rent due in order to either plead not guilty or to prevent being con-
victed of a more serious offense. 
Because most tenants are unrepresented by counsel, and most cases 
never go beyond the arraignment, the statute has been cited by only ten ap-
pellate decisions since 1968, all but one in state courts. No court has ruled 
on its constitutionality since the 2001 amendment requiring the payment of 
alleged rent due, and thus the second due process issue mentioned above has 
not been litigated. 
As Professor Goforth noted, the statute in its pre-2001 form was found 
to be constitutional in Duhon v. State.150 In Duhon, Jacksonville tenant Brid-
get Duhon first argued that Arkansas’s statute was unconstitutional, citing as 
authority Matthews v Eldridge, a case wherein the United States Supreme 
Court held that the denial of social security benefits without an evidentiary 
hearing did not violate due process.151 The Arkansas Supreme Court distin-
guished Matthews on the ground that Arkansas Code, Annotated, section 18-
16-101 required a hearing to determine whether the tenant has willfully re-
fused to vacate.152 As Professor Goforth stated, “[s]ince the existence of the 
right to a hearing was central to the Duhon court’s conclusion that the Ar-
kansas criminal eviction statute was constitutional, it seems relatively clear 
that the [2001] amendment will have placed the statute as currently written 
outside the result and rationale of that opinion.”153 
Duhon’s second argument, citing Shelton v. Tucker, a United States 
Supreme Court decision,154 was that the statute was not the least restrictive 
means available to advance the purpose of the act because it stifled a fun-
damental liberty, and that there was a civil remedy (unlawful detainer) 
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available as a better alternative.155 The Arkansas Supreme Court responded 
that no fundamental right was at stake in Duhon’s case.156 
Duhon’s third argument was that the statute was not a valid exercise of 
the state’s police power, and that Poole v. State, which held the statute con-
stitutional on that ground,157 should be overruled.158 Poole, discussed briefly 
above, validated the statute on the grounds that 1) statutes are presumed to 
be constitutional, especially if they have been in force for a long time; 2) in 
Arkansas, the right to acquire, possess, and protect property is “inherent and 
inalienable and declared higher than any constitutional sanction”; and 3) 
under Arkansas Code, Annotated, section 18-16-101 tenants are criminal 
trespassers, and it is within the police power to protect the “public” from 
such harm.159 
Addressing these reasons, it certainly is a rule of constitutional law that 
statutes are presumed to be constitutional. As another Arkansas Supreme 
Court decision has noted, however, “while these rules [the presumption of 
constitutionality] generally govern constitutional challenges, that is not so 
when the safeguards of personal liberties are at issue.”160 The court used this 
language while striking down a statute, discussed in detail below, that crim-
inalized the failure to pay a supplier or subcontractor for materials.161 Simi-
larly, the right not to be subjected to criminal penalties for breach of a lease 
is an important personal liberty. 
With respect to the Poole court’s second argument, concerning the 
right to acquire, possess, and protect property, the phrase “higher than any 
constitutional sanction”162 apparently comes from the Kentucky Constitution 
of 1850, and was used in conjunction with the right to own slaves.163 In the 
Arkansas Constitution, it precedes a sentence about eminent domain and is 
only rarely construed outside of that context.164 In any case, as a section in 
the “Declaration of Rights” article of the Constitution, the section should be 
construed as limiting the state’s right to interfere with property interests and 
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not, as the Supreme Court in Poole seems to intimate, to justify state action 
such as the failure to vacate statute protecting landlords’ property interests. 
Additionally, since the Poole decision, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated that “the right [of tenants being sued in forcible entry and detainer] to 
continued residence in their homes” is “a significant interest in property.”165 
Tenants as well as landlords have property rights, but the failure to vacate 
statute does not balance them fairly. 
With respect to the Poole court’s concluding argument, as discussed 
above, the common law does not make such tenants criminal trespassers; the 
allegedly unconstitutional failure to vacate law, in effect does. 
2. Imprisonment for Debt 
A tenant who does not pay the alleged amount of rent due into court, if 
convicted, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.166 Imprisonment of up to 
ninety days is one sanction for a Class B misdemeanor. The survey revealed 
that some courts do jail tenants who refuse to move off of the premises and 
who have not paid the alleged amount of rent due. Jail under such circum-
stances, either pre-trial or post-conviction, violates article II, section 16 of 
the Arkansas Constitution, which states “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for 
debt in any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of 
fraud.”167 
Arkansas Supreme Court precedent invalidating a similar statute al-
ready exists. In 1989, the legislature enacted a statute that criminalized the 
knowing or willful failure of a principal contractor or subcontractor to pay a 
supplier or subcontractor for goods furnished to a project within thirty days 
of final receipt of payment under a contract.168 Gary Riggs was arrested on 
two misdemeanor counts of violating the statute, convicted in municipal 
court, and fined almost $4,000.169 He appealed to the Independence County 
Circuit Court, which dismissed the conviction, agreeing with Riggs that the 
statute violated article II, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution.170 The 
state appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by holding the statute un-
constitutional.171 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of unconstitutionali-
ty.172 In its analysis, it relied on its decision in an earlier case, Peairs v. 
State.173 Peairs also involved a statute that made it a felony for a contractor 
who, having been paid all or a portion of the contract price, failed or refused 
to discharge the lien.174 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional 
because it did not make “fraud or fraudulent intent a part or prerequisite of 
the criminal offense. It is the absence of such language in the statutes which 
makes it violative of that portion of the constitution above quoted.”175 The 
court noted that the statute criminalized failing to discharge a lien, which is 
failure to pay a debt.176 It reasoned that “[i]t is not difficult to imagine many 
situations in which a contractor might be prevented from paying the subcon-
tractor . . . even though he may have acted in . . . good faith and without any 
intent to defraud anyone, yet, under the wording of the statute, he could be 
convicted of a felony.”177 Exactly the same could be said about the failure to 
vacate statute, except that it is a misdemeanor and not a felony. 
By the time of the Riggs case, the legislature had modified the statute 
to add a “knowingly or willfully” requirement.178 The state claimed this was 
enough to distinguish Peairs and withstand Riggs’s constitutionality chal-
lenge.179 It cited California precedent, with a similar constitutional provision 
and statute.180 The court was not impressed, however, and relied on oppos-
ing Colorado precedent.181 
Acknowledging the state’s argument that statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, and citing Duhon182 for the proposition, the court nevertheless 
stated “[a]s in the case of all constitutional provisions designed to protect 
the liberties of the individual, every doubt must be resolved in favor of the 
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citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision that no person shall 
be imprisoned for debt.”183 
One is hard put to find a meaningful distinction between Riggs and the 
current failure to vacate law, which requires only “willful” intent and failure 
to pay the deposit of alleged rent due for violation of a Class B misdemean-
or. The failure to vacate statute is a misdemeanor; Riggs was charged with a 
misdemeanor. The intent to defraud was not an element of the Riggs statute; 
it is not an element of the failure to vacate statute. The Peairs court noted 
that without the element of intent to defraud, contractors innocent of bad 
faith could be found guilty and deprived of personal liberty.184 The same 
possibility was present in Riggs and is also present under the failure to va-
cate statute. The constitutionality of the current iteration of the failure to 
vacate statute has not yet been litigated. If and when it is, distinguishing 
Riggs will be difficult. 
3. Proportionality and Unusual Punishment 
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States and the Declaration 
of Rights of the Arkansas Constitution prohibit excessive bail, excessive 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.185 These provisions reflect a codi-
fication of the “proportionality” principle of criminal procedure, that the 
penalty be proportional to the crime. The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportionate to 
the offense.186 “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”187 Indeed, part of the 
Court’s proportionality analysis is “to compare the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”188 The Court has not 
yet ruled on the proportionality of the sentence for a crime that is not a 
crime in any other jurisdiction. 
Consider the hypothetical case of an innocent tenant with an unscrupu-
lous landlord. Rent is due January 1 but the tenant has not paid, perhaps 
because of a misunderstanding with the landlord. On January 2 the tenant 
forfeits the rest of her lease term, no matter its length. If the landlord serves 
the written notice on her on the second, she has ten days to remove herself 
and her property from the premises. If she fails to do so, she can be fined for 
each day she stays. If, because she cannot find another place to live within 
ten days, she is served with a summons or a warrant, she may be required to 
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travel to the courthouse to post bond, or face jail. In most courts, fortunately, 
she will not have that problem, but then if she attempts to plead not guilty 
some courts will require her to pay the amount of rent the landlord alleges is 
due, in order to have a trial. If for some reason she misses her court date, 
instead of a default judgment against her a warrant will be issued for her 
arrest. If she appears at trial, most likely she will not have legal representa-
tion, and her opponent will be not her landlord, but the state, in essence rep-
resenting her landlord free of charge. If she is found guilty and cannot pay 
the resulting fine levied, again she may face jail. Forfeiture of a lease term, 
fines, costs, payment of rent to the landlord, the possibility of criminal con-
viction—all for one day’s late rent, where a tenant is acting in good faith—
arguably this is cruel and unusual punishment. 
4. The Presumption of Innocence 
An axiom of criminal law in the United States is that the defendant is 
presumed innocent. In other words, the defendant need not prove her inno-
cence. Yet that axiom does not hold true in failure to vacate cases. It is true 
that many tenants who are charged with failure to vacate are simply attempt-
ing to occupy the premises before not paying the rent catches up with them. 
But in a state where there is no duty of the landlord to keep premises habita-
ble, it is understandable that tenants’ unhappiness with repairs never made 
eventually may reach the point where they pay for repairs or withhold the 
rent in protest until repairs are made. And the unscrupulous landlord knows 
that at that point he can evict the tenant, and find someone new to begin the 
cycle again. Repairs aside, there are some instances where the rare landlord 
simply lies to the court about the tenant, yet in the world of the failure to 
vacate statute those landlords do not exist. 
For the tenant who is honestly late with the rent, whose landlord is 
falsely accusing her, or who is tired of repeated broken promises by the 
landlord and who feels she has no other options—the deck is stacked against 
the tenant.189 There often seems to be no presumption of innocence in some 
courts. The landlord’s word is taken as fact, and the tenant’s is not. The ten-
ant may be required to pay a bond to be released prior to arraignment, or pay 
the alleged rent due just to tell her story to the court. Few tenants are repre-
sented by counsel. For many with no previous contact with the criminal jus-
tice system the experience is frightening and shameful. The landlord has no 
“skin in the game.” He can file a false affidavit; there will be no conse-
quences. He pays no money to retain an attorney; the prosecutor will do his 
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two egregious examples of real-life landlord misconduct just during the period while re-
searching this article. 
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work at no charge to him. The failure to vacate statute is the underlying 
cause of this imbalance. 
F. Current Alternate Eviction Methods 
Like an irresistible force, landlords all over Arkansas are seeking to 
evict tenants by the least expensive ways possible: these include illegal self-
help, the failure to vacate statute, and an invalid civil eviction statute. A 
significant number of residential landlords are unhappy with the unlawful 
detainer statute.190 There is an alternative eviction statute already on the 
books: a “civil eviction” statute, enacted as part of the Arkansas Residential 
Landlord Tenant Act of 2007, that would allow landlords to sue in district 
court to evict tenants.191 There are two issues with this statute. First, it is 
biased against tenants, as Marshall Prettyman noted in his article.192 To 
summarize his arguments: 1) the service provisions are unclear and possibly 
deficient; 2) tenants’ due process rights are inadequately protected; and 3) if 
a tenant contests an eviction, the statute is unacceptably vague about the 
procedure to be followed.193 The second issue with the statute is jurisdic-
tional, whether district courts have jurisdiction to hear these “civil eviction” 
cases. Prettyman ably discussed this issue as well, but this article will add a 
few new points to the debate. 
Amendment 80, section 7(B) of the Arkansas Constitution states that 
the “subject matter” of civil cases heard by district courts will be determined 
by Supreme Court rule.194 Under the Supreme Court’s Administrative Order 
No. 18, “local” district courts (including small claims courts) have concur-
rent jurisdiction with circuit courts to hear matters in contract not exceeding 
$5,000.195 State district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with circuit 
courts to hear matters in contract not exceeding $25,000.196 However, dis-
trict courts do not have the independent power to issue eviction orders. 
Jurisdiction over district courts is not limited to the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, however. Amendment 80, section 9 states that any court rule promul-
gated under sections 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), or 8 “may be annulled or amended, 
 
 190. See infra text accompanying note 201 for this discussion. 
 191. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-901 to -911 (Supp. 2013). 
 192. Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: the Amendments to the 
Arkansas Residential Landlord–Tenant Act of 2007, A.C.A. 18-17-101 through 913, 35 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1031 (2013) [hereinafter Prettyman, Revisited]; see also Marshall 
Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 Et Seq., 2008 ARK. L. 
NOTES 71 [hereinafter Prettyman, Landlord Protection]. 
 193. Prettyman, Revisited, supra note 192. 
 194. ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 7(B). 
 195. ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 18 (last amended Dec. 13, 2012). 
 196. Thus, pro se landlords can sue tenants for unpaid rent in small claims court, as many 
a court responded to the researchers. 
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in whole or in part, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the membership of each 
house of the General Assembly.”197 
The Residential Landlord Tenant Act of 2007 placed jurisdiction over 
“civil eviction” cases in the district court.198 It passed the House of Repre-
sentatives twice, the second time to concur with a Senate amendment. That 
final vote of the House was ninety-three yeas, two nays, and five not voting. 
However, the Senate vote was twenty-two yeas, zero nays, twelve not voting 
and one excused. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is twenty-four votes.199 
Thus, the Residential Landlord Tenant Act did not place jurisdiction over 
civil evictions in district courts, and district courts are without authority to 
hear those types of evictions. 
In 2009, the legislature made numerous minor amendments to the civil 
eviction statute. One was to insert a phrase that eviction could be com-
menced “in a district court having jurisdiction over the eviction proceed-
ing.”200 This wording, however, does not place jurisdiction in district courts. 
It is clear, then, that district courts do not currently have jurisdiction to hear 
civil eviction cases. Nonetheless, as Appendix A reveals, one of the most 
surprising findings of the research for this article was that at least several 
district courts are hearing such cases, and at least one district court is hear-
ing significant numbers of them. Courts that do so seem to be switching 
from failure to vacate to civil eviction, if they heard failure to vacate cases 
before. 
The Commission was told that illegal landlord self-help evictions take 
place in certain counties, and in the course of this research the author heard 
of additional locations where they occur. It is the author’s belief that self-
help evictions are much more widespread and frequent than most people 
would suspect. 
It is clear that unlawful detainer in its present form is not working. The 
Commission spent more time discussing eviction than any other single issue. 
Landlords criticized the unlawful detainer statute for the filing fee ($165), 
the waiting time before a hearing (weeks, at least) and the need for an attor-
ney to file the action. Landlords said that in a few sparsely populated coun-
ties attorneys were simply not available. Another complaint was the per-
ceived high fees that attorneys would charge.201 
 
 197. ARK. CONST. amend 80, § 9. 
 198. “The district court or appropriate court of this state shall exercise jurisdiction over 
any landlord with respect to any conduct in this state governed by this chapter or with respect 
to any claim arising from a transaction subject to this chapter.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-203 
(Supp. 2013). 
 199. PARLIAMENTARY MANUAL OF THE SENATE, 89TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Rule 23.02 
(2013), http://arkansas.gov/senate/docs/2013-SenateRules.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
 200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-901(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 201. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court has made possible a procedure whereby 
an unlawful detainer action filed in circuit court could then be referred to a 
state district court if all parties consented.202 However, this does not address 
the cost and attorney issues, and may not speed the process significantly. 
Both the Commission and the author have sought to determine whether any 
unlawful detainer cases are being referred. None of the sources asked were 
aware of the existence of any such referrals. 
G. A Better Statutory Framework 
What should a workable summary eviction statute look like? It would 
apply only to residential landlords and tenants. It would combine the 
strengths of both the unlawful detainer and the civil eviction statutes, and 
eschew the weaknesses. The current statutes’ strengths and weaknesses may 
be represented graphically. 
 
Statute Strengths Weaknesses 
Unlawful Detainer Fair to both sides Slow 
 Clear procedure Relatively expensive 
  Necessitates an attorney 
  Tenant cannot cure 
Civil Eviction Fast Service provisions are unclear 
 Relatively inexpensive Deficient due process for tenants 
 
Can be filed pro se (if 
small claims rules used 
most entity landlords 
can file) 
Lack of any procedure if 
tenant contests 
 Tenant has opportunity to cure203  
 
A new statute should have the strengths of both unlawful detainer and 
civil eviction and the weaknesses of neither. It should amend one of the two 
already-existing statutes. If the unlawful detainer statute is amended, the 
civil eviction statute should be repealed. As recommended by the Commis-
sion, the new law should anticipate pro se landlord and tenant representa-
 
 202. ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 18 (last amended Dec. 13, 2012). 
 203. Ark. Code Ann. section 18-17-701 allows a tenant to pay rent five days late, and 
allows a landlord to give a tenant a two-week period to cure any other type of lease violation. 
This provision would be meaningless, however, because the current failure to vacate statute 
allows a landlord to file failure to vacate the moment the rent is late. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-
17-701 (Supp. 2013). 
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tion, by providing forms, either statutory or issued by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court and available on the Internet.204 It should enable entity landlords such 
as LLCs to appear through a designated non-attorney representative. Yet, 
the statute should allow attorneys if the parties wish them. The first stage of 
the hearing should take place in district court; almost all cases will end at 
this first stage. However, tenants must be allowed to introduce evidence on 
their own behalf, and to counterclaim. Either party should be able to appeal 
to circuit court, for a de novo hearing with the right to a jury. This eviction 
statute would cure perceived problems with the existing civil statutes, and 
would more than justify repeal of the failure to vacate statute. 
III. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
Not only are tenants’ rights affected by the anomaly of Arkansas’s fail-
ure to vacate statute, but the impact is compounded because Arkansas does 
not have an implied warranty of habitability. This section will outline the 
history of the warranty, explain its scope, discuss current Arkansas law, and 
recommend a warranty appropriate for the state. 
A. History 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures awak-
ened to the reality of the relationship between the urban residential landlord 
and tenant. The object of the tenant’s bargain was not, as in medieval times, 
an unimproved tract of land that the tenant could farm or improve, but a 
functioning, safe, sanitary living space, with working utilities and applianc-
es. Tenants were no longer farmers, but individuals with full-time jobs away 
from their living premises. Many landlords now routinely covenanted to 
provide repairs. The recognition of these changes resulted in the creation of 
the implied warranty of habitability. 
Without the implied warranty, what is the common law with respect to 
repairs? Absent a covenant to the contrary, landlords have no duty to re-
pair.205 Tenants, as the occupants of the premises, have a duty not to commit 
waste, which imposes a limited duty of repair.206 Failure to repair is viewed 
as permissive waste.207 Tenants are responsible to return the premises in the 
same condition in which they found them, with some exceptions.208 This 
would require repair of damage they or persons on the premises with their 
permission have caused. Typically, tenants are held to make the type of re-
 
 204. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
 205. 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 103 (2012 ed.). 
 206. Id. § 102. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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pairs that will keep the premises “wind and water tight.”209 But typically, a 
tenant is not responsible for a major structural repair,210 such as a roof that 
needs replacing, or repair of total casualty loss, such as a house destroyed by 
a tornado or hurricane. Nor is a tenant responsible for ordinary wear and 
tear.211 
Arkansas courts follow the common law; the rule expressed in numer-
ous cases is simply that absent a covenant to the contrary in the lease, a 
landlord is not liable for any repair.212 
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.213 is usually credited with being 
the first decision to recognize the implied warranty.214 “[A]dequate heat, 
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and 
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance” were described as part of 
the “package” that a modern tenant expected when entering into a lease.215 
Hot on the heels of Javins, in 1972 the Uniform Law Commission adopted 
the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA),216 providing a stat-
utory version of an implied warranty, as well as a comprehensive, balanced 
framework of landlord-tenant law addressing creation and termination of 
leases as well as rights and duties of landlords and tenants. Twenty-one 
states enacted the URLTA.217 Most of the rest of the states enacted statutory 
 
 209. Id.; 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.05[c][2]. 
 210. TIFFANY, supra note 205, § 102. 
 211. POWELL, supra note 209, § 56.05[c][2]. 
 212. “At common law the lessor owed no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee. 
Arkansas law follows this rule.” Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 38, 60 S.W.3d 415, 418 
(2001). See also Huber Rental Properties, LLC v. Allen, 2012 Ark. App. 642, 8, ___ S.W.3d 
___; Miller v. Centerpoint Energy Res. Corp., 98 Ark. App. 102, 110, 250 S.W.3d 574, 580 
(2007). 
 213. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1074. 
 216. For the text of the act see UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, 7B 
U.L.A. 289 (2006). The text is also available on the website of the Uniform Law Commission 
at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta%
201974.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
 217. ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 
(2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (2007 & Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
47a-7 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
521-42 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-8-
23 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1419 (Lex-
isNexis 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 47-8-20 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 
118 (1999 & Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.320 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 34-18-22 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (LexisNexis 
2005). 
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warranties, some of which are modeled on the URLTA218 and some of which 
are not.219 Georgia, for example, simply states that “[t]he landlord must keep 
the premises in repair.”220 Illinois and New Jersey still rely on a judicial im-
plied warranty of habitability.221 
B. What the Warranty Covers 
The original statutory warranty in the URLTA is fairly short in length. 
It requires landlords to do the following: 
1. Comply with building and housing code provisions that materially 
affect health and safety; 
2. Do what is necessary to keep premises in a fit and habitable condi-
tion; 
3. Keep common areas clean and safe; 
4. Maintain electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, 
air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, that 
are supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord; 
5. Provide receptacles for garbage and arrange for its removal; and 
6. Provide running water, hot water, and heat, unless these are under 
the control of the tenant.222 
The URLTA provides that a lease may not include a tenant’s waiver of 
the implied warranty.223 
Notable variations to this list include disclosing prior methampheta-
mine manufacture on the premises;224 maintaining structural components, 
 
 218. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-505 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (2009); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (LexisNexis 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.290 (West 
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1999); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (2004 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2014). 
 219. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 2696 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (2003 & Supp. 2013); MD. CODE 
ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 2003); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West 2002 
& Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.234 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14 
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2006); 35 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1700-1 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED. LAWS § 43-32-8 (2004); TEX. PROP. 
CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 2002 & Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3 (LexisNexis 
2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4457 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1201 (2013). 
 220. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (2010). 
 221. Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 1985); Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17 
(N.J. 1973). 
 222. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 326 (2006). 
 223. Id. § 1.403, 7B U.L.A. 313. 
 224. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118(D) (1999 & Supp. 2014). 
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such as doors, walls, and ceilings;225 controlling infestation by rodents and 
insects, unless caused by the tenant;226 providing adequate locks and keys 
and maintaining the security of master and duplicate keys; 227 providing 
smoke detection devices228 and carbon monoxide detectors;229 eliminating 
conditions contributing to mosquito infestation and mold caused by plumb-
ing leaks or inadequate drainage;230 and not allowing falling or fallen plaster 
from walls and ceilings.231 
In a country of such climatic diversity and weather extremes as the 
United States, one would expect to see, and there is to some extent, habita-
bility contingent on climate. For example, Minnesota requires weather 
proofing against cold if the cost will be realized by savings.232 New Hamp-
shire requires an average heat of sixty-five degrees to be obtainable.233 Flor-
ida, on the other hand, requires screens.234 
In 2011, the Uniform Law Commission’s Drafting Committee on the 
Revised Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RURLTA) began work 
on revisions to the original uniform law, which at that point was almost for-
ty years old. At the time of this writing, the RURLTA was read for the first 
time at the 2013 annual meeting of the Uniform Law Commission. It will 
continue to be revised during the next one or two years, but at present, it 
modifies the original implied warranty of habitability in the following ways: 
1.  Landlords must provide effective waterproofing and weather protec-
tion; 
2.  Plumbing facilities must be connected to an approved sewage dis-
posal method; 
3.  Premises must be free of rodents, bedbugs and other vermin, mold, 
radon, asbestos and other hazardous substances; 
4.  Exterior doors and windows must be secure, with working locks or 
other security devices; and 
5.  If required by law landlords must provide other safety devices (such 
as smoke detectors).235 
 
 225. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). 
 226. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(4). 
 227. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060(6), (7). 
 228. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51(2)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
24-303(h) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(5) (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
59.18.060(12). 
 229. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(7); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303. 
 230. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42(8)(l). 
 231. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14(V) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 232. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161(a)(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014). 
 233. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14(XI). 
 234. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). 
 235. REVISED UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT § 303 (May 30, 2013 
draft), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20 
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Thus, new additions to the warranty add to safety (locks, smoke detec-
tors, etc.), sanitation (sewage disposal and freedom from vermin), and struc-
tural soundness. 
C. Limits on the Warranty 
1. Enforcement 
The URLTA divides breaches of the implied warranty into three types. 
For willful or negligent lack of “essential services,” such as heat or water, 
tenants may after giving reasonable notice obtain such services or obtain 
substitute housing and deduct the cost from their rent, recover diminution of 
value damages, or terminate the lease.236 If the breach is one “materially 
affecting health and safety,” after the landlord has had fourteen days in 
which to repair the problem if no repair is affected the landlord can termi-
nate the lease.237 If the breach is remediable by repair or damages and the 
landlord remedies the breach by the date in the notice, the tenant cannot 
terminate the lease.238 
The URLTA also permits tenants to receive injunctive relief and actual 
damages, and, in a significant change from the common law, allows tenants 
to use self-help to repair if the cost of repair is low and the landlord has 
failed to repair, deducting the amount from their rent, again with the excep-
tion for damage caused by the tenant.239 However, in none of these instances 
will any liability be imposed on the landlord if the condition was caused by 
the tenant, her family, or invitees or licensees.240 
States have limited the implied warranty in different ways. Following 
are just a few examples. Kansas exempts the landlord from his duties if he is 
prevented by “an act of God, the failure of public utility services or other 
conditions beyond the landlord’s control.”241 Pennsylvania restricts the war-
ranty to cities of the first through third classes, but has a bright-line reme-
dy—a landlord whose property is certified “unfit for human habitation” can 
no longer collect rent from his tenants, until the property is either recertified 
as fit or the lease is terminated for reasons other than nonpayment of rent.242 
The tenant who continues occupation must deposit rent in a government-
 
and%20Tenant/2013AM_RURLTA_Draft.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
 236. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383. 
 237. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383. 
 238. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375. 
 239. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.103, 7B U.L.A. 382. 
 240. URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. 375; § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383. 
 241. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (2005). 
 242. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1700-1 (2012). 
40 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
approved escrow account during the interval.243 Virginia limits the land-
lord’s liability to “actual damages” proximately caused by the landlord’s 
failure to exercise ordinary care.244 It does not impose tort liability on land-
lords245 except for damages caused by negligent repair.246 
2. Liability for Damage or Injury to the Tenant’s Property or Person 
One non-uniform area of landlord-tenant law is whether tenants or their 
invitees may recover for such harms as personal injury, emotional distress, 
or damage to personal property damage caused by a landlord’s breach of a 
lease. In theory, there could be two legal theories justifying damages: con-
tract law, under the theory of consequential damages, and tort law.247 
a. Breach of Contract 
Consequential, or indirect, damages are damages that flow indirectly 
from an act, rather than directly.248 American courts generally follow Hadley 
v. Baxendale, an 1854 English decision holding that lost profits (consequen-
tial damages) are not recoverable under a contract unless specifically con-
templated by the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.249 Ar-
kansas defines consequential damages as the “damage, loss or injury as does 
not flow directly and immediately from the act of the party, but only from 
some of the consequences or results of such act.”250 Consequential damages 
are usually economic in nature, such as lost profits, but a few residential 
tenants have attempted to obtain them for damage or injury to their persons 
or personal property caused by the landlord’s alleged breach of the lease. In 
such a case, the Indiana Supreme Court commented: 
[R]ecovery for personal injury on a contract claim is allowable only 
when the particular injury was within the parties’ contemplation during 
contract formation. Thus, to claim consequential damages the tenant 
must show the parties intended to compensate for personal injury losses 
caused by the apartment’s unfitness. The tenant may prove the promise 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13(B) (2012). 
 245. Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., 644 S.E.2d 72, 78 (Va. 2007). 
 246. Sales v. Kecoughtan Hous. Co., 690 S.E.2d 91, 93–94 (Va. 2010). 
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 248. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 249. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
 250. Optical Partners, Inc. v. Dang, 2011 Ark. 156, *15, 381 S.W.3d 46, 55 (quoting 
Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 314 Ark. 591, 604–05, 864 S.W.2d 817, 825 (1993)). 
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to compensate personal injury by showing its expression as a contract 
term or by pointing to evidence showing it to be implied in the agree-
ment.251 
As Lonegrass notes, few American courts have awarded claims for per-
sonal injury or personal property damage brought by residential tenants un-
der a consequential damages theory.252 Only a handful of Arkansas cases 
have considered consequential damages under a lease. In these cases, the 
leases were commercial or agricultural. The types of consequential damages 
claimed were lost profits,253 destroyed merchandise,254 and destroyed 
crops.255 
b. Tort 
Traditionally, landlords were not liable for tort damages, such as per-
sonal injury or damages to personal property of a tenant or her invitees, 
caused by defective premises.256 This rule is often expressed as “caveat les-
see.” The common law recognized only a few exceptions. Those typically 
listed are injuries caused by common areas, undisclosed latent defects pre-
sent at the beginning of the term, breaches of a covenant to repair, negligent 
repairs, and defective areas used by the public.257 Arkansas recognizes only 
two exceptions: failure to reasonably perform an agreement to repair that is 
supported by consideration, and failure to reasonably repair under an as-
sumed obligation.258 
An extended discussion of tort liability of landlords is outside of the 
scope of this article, but the issue is raised here to clarify that enactment of 
an implied warranty of habitability does not automatically result in expand-
 
 251. Johnson v. Scandia Associates, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. 1999) (internal cita-
tions omitted) (refusing to award consequential damages for personal injury under an implied 
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 254. See Shelton v. Albertson, No. CA 92-109, 1992 WL 79537, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 
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 258. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2013). See Kathryn Hake, 
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Landlord Tort Liability and Maintains Common Law “Caveat Lessee,” 59 ARK. L. REV. 737 
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ed tort liability for landlords, although many persons erroneously assume 
that it does. The URLTA does not expressly impose such liability, although 
the comment to section 1.105 states that “[w]hether tort action, specific per-
formance or equitable relief is available is determined not by this section but 
by specific provisions and supplementary principles”259 and refers the reader 
to Section 1.103, which provides that the act is supplemented by other prin-
ciples of law and equity260 (interestingly, although a number of areas of law 
such as bankruptcy and contract are mentioned, torts is not). 
Even though the URLTA does not expressly impose tort liability on 
landlords for tenant or third-party injury caused by breach of the implied 
warranty, a significant number of states have done so, reasoning that the 
implied warranty of habitability imposes a duty which, if breached, causes 
tort liability.261 Other states have refused to impose liability in tort under the 
implied warranty.262 
D. Current Arkansas Law 
Arkansas currently follows the common law rule that a landlord has no 
duty to repair unless he covenants to do so,263 subject to the two codified 
exceptions noted above. If the landlord covenants to repair, property damag-
es for defective premises typically take the form of the difference in value 
between the defective premises and premises without defects, or the cost of 
repair. Many, if not most, of the cases citing this rule are suits in tort for 
personal injury to the tenant or her family members or invitees, or for dam-
 
 259. URLTA § 1.105 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 295. 
 260. URLTA § 1.103, 7B U.L.A. 294. 
 261. See, e.g., Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1213 (Alaska 1994); Scott v. Garfield, 
912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009) (holding a tenant’s invitee may recover for personal 
injury caused by landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability); Joiner v. Haley, 
777 So.2d 50, 52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (conceding that a tenant may pursue tort remedies for 
breach of implied warranty of habitability); Shorter v. Neapolitan, 902 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 
(Oh. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that URLTA implied warranty of habitability expanded land-
lord tort liability from already-existing common law liability); Merrill v. Jansma, 86 P.3d 
270, 289 ¶ 48 (Wyo. 2004) (holding landlord has a duty of reasonable care under the circum-
stances). 
 262. See, e.g., Schuman v. Kobets, 760 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Steward ex 
rel. Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Va. 2012) (holding the 
implied warranty of habitability imposes duty in contract, not in tort); Favreau v. Miller, 591 
A.2d 68, 73 (Vt. 1991); Lian v. Stalick, 25 P.3d 467, 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). Alabama 
enacted the URLTA in 2007, but as amended to create no duties or causes of action in tort. 
ALA. CODE ANN. § 35-9A-102(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 263. Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 38, 60 S.W.3d 415, 418 (2001); Propst v. McNeill, 
326 Ark. 623, 624, 932 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1996); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 108, 661 
S.W.2d 393, 394 (1983). 
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age to personal property.264 Few of them deal with defective premises pre-
venting occupation or requiring repair. Of those that do, most involve com-
mercial tenants. The warranty in these cases is often referred to as a warran-
ty of habitability, but if the tenant is commercial, it is more accurately char-
acterized as a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
A recent case concerning the duty to repair is Huber Rental Properties, 
LLC v. Allen.265 A landlord sued tenants, who had sought to terminate their 
lease and had moved out, under a rent acceleration clause.266 The landlord 
also sought late fees and costs.267 The lease contained instructions for re-
questing repairs and maintenance.268 The dispute involved a carpet that had 
not been cleaned at the beginning of the lease term, a garbage disposal with 
insects living in it, a large tree limb that had fallen in a storm that blocked 
the front door for weeks, and lack of keys to the side door, requiring the 
tenants to leave the only usable door unlocked at all times.269 The trial court 
found that the landlord materially breached the lease.270 On appeal, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed that the landlord breached the duty of repair.271 Alt-
hough the lease did not specifically state that the landlord promised to repair 
the premises, the lease did include a procedure for tenants to request repairs 
and maintenance.272 The problem with the lack of an implied warranty of 
habitability, however, is that landlords like the one in this case will simply 
remove all mention of repair from their leases.273 One way in which repair 
could be facilitated without an implied warranty would be to prohibit land-
lords who have outstanding citations for code violations from bringing fail-
ure to vacate prosecutions. This would not work in an area with no housing 
codes, however. 
One of most important decisions discussing the implied warranty of 
habitability in recent years has been Propst v. McNeill.274 In this case, 
Propst, the owner of a plane, executed a lease with the Walnut Ridge Airport 
 
 264. Thomas, 347 Ark. at 38, 60 S.W.3d at 418; Stalter v. Akers, 303 Ark. 603, 798 
S.W.2d 428 (1990). 
 265. 2012 Ark. App. 642, ___ S.W.3d ___. 
 266. Id. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 267. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 268. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 269. Id. at 3–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 270. Id. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 271. Huber Rental Props., 2012 Ark. App. 642, at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 272. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 273. Legal Services attorneys report that they are seeing fewer leases with landlord repair 
clauses. Duke & Fletcher Interview, supra note 69. 
 274. 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d 766 (1996); see also Stephen J. Maddox, Case Note, 
Propst v. McNeill: Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law, a Time for Change, 51 ARK. L. REV. 575 
(1998). 
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Commission.275 He stored his plane in a hangar at the airport.276 After a 
storm damaged the hangar and his plane, Propst sued various parties, but 
lost at the trial court level.277 On appeal, he first argued that Arkansas should 
require landlords to exercise reasonable care with respect to the condition of 
rental premises and repeal caveat lessee.278 Propst was arguing for tort liabil-
ity to be imposed here so that he could recover the damages to his personal 
property. One of the arguments the Commission made in response was that 
the legislature and not the court should make such a momentous change in 
the law.279 It pointed to the enactment of the URLTA as the means by which 
legislatures were achieving this end.280 This was wrong on two points. First, 
as discussed above, the URLTA does not expressly impose tort liability on 
landlords. Second, the URLTA only applies to residential leases. It would 
not have affected the airport lease even if Arkansas had enacted it. 
The court noted the age of the rule of caveat lessee and stated its often-
cited rule that it will uphold prior precedent unless “great injury or injustice” 
would result.281 The court stated that even if it were inclined to overrule ca-
veat lessee, the facts in Propst were not appealing—Propst was an experi-
enced businessman.282 
In a second very significant case, Thomas v. Stewart,283 the tenant 
plaintiff again invited the court to overrule caveat lessee. In this case, Kathe-
rine Thomas’s child fell two stories when a balcony railing he was leaning 
on collapsed.284 Thomas cited Propst, and in the court’s decision, denying 
summary judgment in favor of the landlord, the court again noted its prefer-
ence that the legislature take up the issue.285 The court stated that because 
Thomas had not provided it with any information as to whether the legisla-
ture was taking action, it was hesitant to address the issue.286 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brown noted that it had been almost 
thirty years since the URLTA was adopted and “undoubtedly” it had been 
 
 275. Propst, 326 Ark. at 624, 923 S.W.2d at 767. 
 276. Id., 923 S.W.2d at 767. 
 277. Id., 923 S.W.2d at 767. 
 278. Id. at 625, 932 S.W.2d at 767. 
 279. Id. at 625, 932 S.W.2d at 768. 
 280. Id. at 626, 932 S.W.2d at 768. 
 281. Propst, 326 Ark. At 626, 923 S.W.2d at 768. See Miller v. Enders, 2013 Ark. 23, 
___ S.W.3d ___; McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, ___ S.W.3d ___ ; and 
Independence Federal Bank v. Paine Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 789 S.W.2d 725 (1990) for the 
latest expressions of the rule. The court almost always uses this phrase when declining to 
overrule past precedent. It can be found in fifty-six decisions. 
 282. Propst, 326 Ark. at 627, 932 S.W.2d at 768. 
 283. 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415 (2001). 
 284. Id. at 36, 60 S.W.3d at 416. 
 285. Id. at 41, 60 S.W.3d at 421. 
 286. Id., 60 S.W.3d at 421. 
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proposed to the General Assembly on several occasions during that time but 
the legislature had never enacted it.287 In the three legislative sessions be-
tween Propst and Thomas, the legislature had taken no action.288 Justice 
Brown opined that it would be appropriate for the court to address the issue 
of landlord tort liability the next time it was presented with the issue.289 He 
listed other areas of law where the court had acted, after unsuccessfully ask-
ing the legislature to take up the issue: abolishing tort immunity for political 
subdivisions,290 abolishing the absolute rule of nonliability for vendors who 
sell alcohol to minors,291 and imposing dramshop liability.292 
The Supreme Court has recognized that it “has a duty to change the 
common law when it is no longer reflective of economic and social needs of 
society.”293 “Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so 
manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. Any rule of law not 
leading to the right result calls for rethinking and perhaps redoing.”294 In all 
three of the cases, the court looked to other states and noted that Arkansas 
was in the minority, and that the common law had evolved, or that statutes 
had reversed the old common law rules. The same can be argued with re-
spect to the implied warranty of habitability. 
The URLTA was adopted in 1972. Looking only as far back as 1991, it 
was introduced as one or more bills in the legislative sessions in 1991, 1993, 
and 2001.295 The half favorable to landlords was enacted in 2007, after all 
pro-tenant provisions were removed.296 Has the law in other states changed? 
Yes. Arkansas stands alone as the only state without an implied warranty of 
habitability. 
One argument made by landlords against an implied warranty of habit-
ability is that Arkansas’s rents are the lowest of any state, according to 2012 
statistics released by the National Low Income Housing Coalition. In the 
words of the Commission Report, 
In the spring of 2012, the National Low Income Housing Coalition re-
leased its report on the state of rental housing availability for low income 
renters, Out of Reach 2012. This report indicated that Arkansas had the 
 
 287. Id. at 43, 60 S.W.3d at 421 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 288. Id., 60 S.W.3d at 421. 
 289. Thomas, 347 Ark. at 43, 60 S.W.3d at 421. 
 290. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968). 
 291. Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997). 
 292. Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999). 
 293. Shannon, 329 Ark. at 151, 947 S.W.2d at 353. 
 294. Parish, 244 Ark. at 1252, 429 S.W.2d at 52. 
 295. It was introduced as House Bills 426, 1621, and 1851 in 1991; and as Senate Bill 
373 in 2001. 
 296. The pro-landlord half of the URLTA is codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101 
through 18-17-802. See also generally Prettyman, Landlord Protection, supra note 192. 
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lowest fair market rent (“FMR”) for a two-bedroom dwelling unit ($593 
per month) of all fifty states. However, Arkansas was not drastically be-
low all other states. West Virginia’s FMR was $598, South Dakota’s 
$599, Kentucky’s $616, Mississippi’s $622, Iowa’s $637 and North Da-
kota’s $639. Lest the reader think that this means housing is a terrific 
bargain in Arkansas, it should also be pointed out that Arkansas’s annual 
median income (“AMI”), at $51,900, was the third lowest of the states. 
Lower than Arkansas are Mississippi, at $48,871, and West Virginia, at 
$51,549. All of these states have an implied warranty of habitability, two 
of them (Iowa and Kentucky) have enacted the URLTA, and all but 
North Dakota prohibit retaliatory eviction.297 
Updating these statistics, the author discovered that despite Arkansas’s 
extreme lack of tenant rights, it no longer has the lowest rent. That state is 
now North Dakota, with a two-bedroom fair market rent of $627. Kentucky, 
at $661, is in second place. Arkansas’s rent is $663.298 No longer can the 
inference be made that Arkansas’s rent is lowest because, unlike all other 
states, it has no implied warranty of habitability. Marshall Prettyman has 
also pointed out some factors having a causal effect on low rents, such as 
low property taxes.299 Very few studies have been made of the effect of an 
implied warranty on rent rates. The most recent is a student comment pub-
lished in 2011. The author states that “[t]o the extent that this Comment at-
tempts to determine whether or not the implied warranty is related to higher 
rent rates, the conclusion appears affirmative.”300 However, there is another 
way to think of the warranty besides aggregate rental statistics, and that is its 
effect on individual landlords and tenants, where it will allow a tenant in 
unlivable conditions to compel a change that she could not before, or where 
a landlord will have clear guidance as to the minimum quality of premises to 
be supplied to tenants. 
Another argument against implied warranties of habitability is that they 
are not needed because tenants can simply report deficiencies in housing to 
code enforcement agencies. First, not all areas of the state are covered by 
housing codes. Most rural areas and many smaller cities and towns are not. 
Second, the tenant who reports her landlord to code enforcement will, like 
the tenant observed by the author at the Little Rock Criminal Court clerk’s 
office, be the object of retaliation by the landlord. If the tenant is month-to-
month, the landlord can simply terminate the lease in less than two months. 
If not, and the landlord is unscrupulous enough, the landlord can simply 
 
 297. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 298. NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 2013, available at 
http://nlihc.org/oor/2013 (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
 299. Prettyman, Revisited, supra note 192. 
 300. Michael A. Brower, Comment, The “Backlash” of the Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility: Theory v. Analysis, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 889 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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refuse to accept the rent, or otherwise misrepresent the facts on the failure to 
vacate affidavit. It is for this reason that an implied warranty of habitability 
must be accompanied by a prohibition against retaliatory eviction, which 
most states have. 
As the plaintiff in Stewart recognized, probably the most analogous 
case to an implied warranty of habitability for tenants is Wawak v. Stewart, 
which judicially adopted an implied warranty of quality for new home con-
struction in Arkansas.301 As modified by subsequent decisions, the warranty 
applies to material latent defects in construction.302 It lasts for five years 
from substantial completion of construction.303 The measure of damages is 
either the cost of repair, or the difference in value between the promised 
structure and the defective structure.304 The implied warranty does not im-
pose a duty of care, and does not sound in tort. However, negligence has 
traditionally been available as a cause of action against negligent workman-
ship by contractors.305 
The Wawak case was well briefed on appeal. The court invited amicus 
curiae briefs, and at least two were filed, by the Arkansas Attorney General 
and by the Arkansas Homebuilders Association.306 The court was eager to 
join the minority, but modern trend of decisions adopting the warranty—it 
refers to six states having adopted it in the previous decade.307 The decision 
is full of citations to secondary authority and quotations from the decisions 
of other states. In support of its decision the court mentioned the lack of 
bargaining power between the home builder and buyer, and the modern need 
for such a warranty. The court stated “[a]s might be expected, we have been 
presented with the timeworn, threadbare argument that a court is legislating 
whenever it modifies common-law rules to achieve justice in the light of 
modern economic and technological advances.”308 
E. A Warranty for Arkansas 
If the author could fashion an implied warranty for Arkansas, what 
form would it take? First, the warranty should be statutory. It should contain 
the requirements of the RURLTA warranty with the qualification, adopted 
by some states, that plumbing and electrical work be in compliance with 
 
 301. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970). 
 302. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 642, 128 S.W.3d 438, 443 (2003). 
 303. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112(a) (Repl. 2005); Rogers v. Mallory, 328 Ark. 116, 
119–20, 941 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1997). 
 304. Daniel v. Quick, 270 Ark. 528, 533, 606 S.W.2d 81, 84 (1980). 
 305. See, e.g., Marshall v. Turman Const. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 686, ___ S.W.3d ___. 
 306. Wawak, 247 Ark. at 1094, 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 923, 925. 
 307. Id. at 1095, 449 S.W.2d at 923. 
 308. Id. at 1099, 449 S.W.2d at 925. 
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codes in force at the time they were installed. It should have a provision 
requiring a quicker response for emergency repairs, recognizing that repair 
response time is sometimes out of the control of the landlord, and a reasona-
ble repair and deduct provision, especially if a landlord refuses to make a 
qualifying repair. 
Second, tenants should be able to sue under the warranty as easily as 
landlords should be able to sue for eviction. Tenants should be able to bring 
suit in district or small claims court, using official forms, such as the Com-
mission recommended for eviction suits.309 They should be able to bring 
suits pro se. Most importantly, they should be able to raise the issue of the 
breach of the implied warranty as a defense to a landlord’s eviction action. 
Third, tenants must not be able to waive their right to the warranty, and 
must not be subject to retaliatory eviction. An implied warranty is of little 
good if tenants are forced to sign leases giving up their rights to repairs, and 
can easily be evicted if they complain to code enforcement. 
In lieu of a statutory warranty, the way is clear, given Supreme Court 
statements in previous cases, for the court to find a judicial warranty, on 
condition that the right case comes along. With respect to tort liability, the 
clear trend is for some type of tort liability of landlords for personal injury 
or property damage caused by a landlord’s breach of the implied warranty. 
The Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to take up the issue, in an 
appropriate case. At a minimum, Arkansas should impose the duty to keep 
common areas clean and safe, and impose tort liability for failure to do so. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas is seriously out of step with the rest of the United States in 
two important areas of landlord-tenant law: its crime of failure to vacate, 
and the lack of an implied warranty of habitability. The last enactments of 
the legislature in this area, in 2001 and 2007, produced a criminal statute 
with grave constitutional deficiencies and a lopsided civil statute containing 
mostly landlord rights and tenant obligations. Landlord-tenant legislation 
should be drafted by representatives of both landlords and tenants. The 
Landlord-Tenant Study Commission was a first step in this direction, but it 
had no time to draft legislation. Hopefully, it will not be the last step. 
Evictions and lack of repairs are often linked. Tenants, frustrated by the 
unwillingness of some landlords to make repairs, stop paying rent and are 
evicted. Landlords have no incentive to use the unlawful detainer statute if 
in their county they can use a prosecutor to lever a tenant off the premises, if 
 
 309. See, e.g., Hennepin County, Minnesota’s form for a tenant’s petition for emergency 
relief, http://www.mncourts.gov/default.aspx?page=513&item=295&itemType=formDetails 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
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the tenant is late with the rent or has stopped paying rent in protest. The 
failure to vacate statute is enforced—or not—unevenly across the state with 
respect to whether it can even be filed and what sanctions judges’ order. 
Every day judges exceed their authority under the statute by ordering tenants 
off of the rental premises. Judges also ignore mandatory provisions of the 
statute, often in an attempt to try to fairly enforce a contradictory statute. 
Landlords have legitimate criticisms of the unlawful detainer statute. It 
should be amended to provide a quicker, less expensive procedure that land-
lords can file pro se, in district court, with the opportunity for appeal to cir-
cuit court. The Commission has recommended that once the civil eviction 
statutes are reformed the failure to vacate statute should be repealed. Legal 
reform of both the criminal eviction law and the duty to repair is long over-
due and will produce a net benefit for the state of Arkansas and its citizens. 
APPENDIX A 
TREATMENT OF FAILURE TO VACATE CASES IN ARKANSAS COURTS 
An “N/A” in the third column means that after repeated tries, research-
ers were unable to contact court personnel qualified to answer the questions. 
Contacts were asked whether the district court handled failure to vacate cas-
es. If the answer was yes, then they were asked approximately how many 
per year. A “U” in the Yes/No column meant the respondent was unsure as 
to the court’s jurisdiction, and no cases had been heard there in years. An 
asterisked number is an actual number, either of affidavits filed in a year or 
handled during a year. Contacts were asked whether there was a typical dis-
position. “D” means dismissed (typically if the tenant has moved out or in 
the judge’s discretion); “N” means nolle prossed (again, typically the tenant 
has moved out); “F” means fined. “V” with a number means the tenant is 
given a certain number of days to vacate, usually without being fined. The 
next three columns concern whether the penalties listed could ever be a pos-
sible outcome in that particular court. The “Jail, Ever” column answers the 
question whether a tenant could ever be jailed as a sentence. Of course, ten-
ants can be jailed for failure to appear or failure to pay a fine. Those situa-
tions are not covered by the question. Under the “Comments” column, “SC” 
means landlords must sue in small claims court to recover rent owed. Courts 
that do not hear FTV cases are highlighted. Some courts are listed “no” but 
not highlighted because they refer their FTV cases to another court that does 
hear them, or because they don’t have jurisdiction to hear FTV cases. “R” in 
the “Comments” column indicates a response that FTV cases are referred to 
another court. The citation “18-17-901” in the “Comments” column means it 
was either clear or appeared from answers that the court was hearing “civil 
eviction” cases. 
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Fine Back Rent 
Jail, 
ever? Comments 
Arkansas DeWitt No       
 Gillett No       
 St. Charles No       
 Stuttgart Yes 5 D or N $25/day No No SC 
Ashley Crossett Yes 12 D or F $25/day Yes, paid from fines No  




Baxter Briarcliff No      R Mtn Home 
 Cotter No      R Mtn Home 
 Gassville No      R Mtn Home 
 Lakeview No      R Mtn Home 




No No Ordered to vacate 
 Norfork  No      R Mtn Home 
 Salesville No      R Mtn Home 
Benton Bentonville No       
 Bethel Heights No       
 Cave Springs No       
 Centerton No       
 Decatur No       
 Gentry No       
 Gravette No       
 Little Flock No       
 Lowell No       
 Pea Ridge No       
 Rogers No       
 Siloam Springs No       
 Sulphur Springs No       
Boone Alpena No       
 Harrison No       
Bradley Warren Yes 1 or 2 F Yes Yes No  
Calhoun Hampton Yes 6 D or N $175 No No  
Carroll Berryville No       
 Eureka Springs No       
 Green Forest No       
Chicot Dermott Yes <1  Yes No No SC 
 Eudora Yes 1 or 2 F Yes Yes No 
Must 
appear even 
if they have 
moved out 
 Lake Village Yes 1 or 2 F $300 Yes No  
Clark Amity No      R Arkadel-phia 
 Arkadelphia Yes 9* D or F $140 Yes No Court may 










 Caddo Valley Yes 9 D or F Yes Some-times Yes  




Clay Corning Yes 4 F Yes Yes No  
 Piggott Yes 6 F Yes Yes No  
 Rector  Yes      R Piggott 
Cleburne Concord No      R Heber Spgs 
 Greers Ferry No      R Heber Spgs 
 Heber Springs Yes 6 F Per day Some-times No  







Cleveland Rison No       
Columbia Magnolia Yes <1 N     
 Waldo No      R Magnolia 
Conway Mennifee No      R Morrilton 
 Morrilton Yes 12 F Yes No No SC 
 Oppelo No      R Morrilton 
 Plummerville Yes < 1 D or F Per day No No  
Craighead Jonesboro Yes 35* N $205 No No  
 Lake City Yes 3  $205 No No  
Crawford Alma No       
 Mountainberg No       
 Mulberry No       
 Van Buren No      18-17-901 
Crittenden Earle Yes 2   $195 No No SC 
 Gilmore No      R Marion 
 Jericho No      R elsewhere 
 Marion Yes 4  $25/day No Rarely SC 
 Turrell No      R elsewhere 






If T pleads 
guilty and 
pays fine, 
SC for rent 
Cross Cherry Valley N/A       
 Parkin No       
 Wynne No       
Dallas Fordyce No       
 Sparkman No       
Desha Dumas Yes 25 D or F $265 No No SC 
 McGehee Yes 4 to 6 D Seldom No Possibly SC 
Drew Monticello No      
Seem to be 
using 18-
17-901 
Faulkner Conway Yes 1 or 2  $150 Yes   
 Damascus No       
 Greenbrier Yes 4 D or F $175 Yes No  
 Guy No       
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 Mayflower No       
 Mount Vernon N/A       
 Vilonia No       
Franklin Altus No       





 Ozark No       
Fulton Mammoth Springs No      R Salem 
 Salem Yes 20 D Rarely No No  
Garland Hot Springs (city) Yes 147* N Rarely No No  
 Hot Springs (cty) Yes 158* N Rarely No No  
Grant Sheridan Yes 1 or 2 D or N  No No SC 
Greene Marmaduke No      
Seem to be 
using 18-
17-901 
 Paragould Yes 10 D or F $25/day Some-times No SC, usually 
Hempstead Hope Yes 30 D No No No  
Hot Spring Donaldson No      R Malvern 
 Malvern Yes 7* F and V Flat fee No No SC 
 Rockport No      R Malvern 
Howard Nashville Yes 6  $250 No No  
Independ-








Izard Horseshoe Bend Yes 1 D Rarely No No SC 
 Melbourne No       
Jackson Diaz No      R Newport 






No SC  
 Swifton No      R Newport 
 Tuckerman No       
Jefferson Altheimer No      Traffic only 
 Humphrey No       
 Pine Bluff No      18-17-901 
 Redfield No       
 Wabbaseka No       
 White Hall No      Traffic only 
Johnson Clarksville Yes 10 D or F Yes    
 Coal Hill Yes 0     Would hear if filed 
 Lamar Yes 3  $145 No No  
Lafayette Bradley No      R Lewis-ville 
 Lewisville Yes 3 F $25/day No No  
 Stamps No      R Lewis-ville 
Lawrence Black Rock Yes  D or F $250 No Yes  
 Hoxie Yes  D or F $250 No Yes  
 Walnut Ridge Yes 2 (whole county) D or N $250 No Yes SC 
Lee Marianna Yes 4  $25/day No No  
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Lincoln Gould No      R Star City 
 Grady No      Traffic only 
 Star City–city and county Yes <5 D or F 
$175 or 
$25/day Possible No SC 
Little 
River Ashdown Yes 4 or 5 V=30 $230 No No 
SC, ordered 
to vacate 
 Winthrop No       
Logan Booneville Yes 2 or 3 F Yes Yes No  
 Magazine No      None since 2009 
 Paris Yes 5 or 6 F Yes Yes No  
Lonoke Cabot Yes N/A D Yes No No  




4 D     
 Lonoke Yes 5 or 6 D     
 Ward Yes 4 or 5  $205 No Yes SC 
Madison Huntsville No       
Marion Bull Shoals No       
 Flippin No       
 Yellville No       
Miller Texarkana Yes 360 N or F $265 plus $25/day No No  
Mississip-
pi Blytheville Yes 10  $25/day No No SC 






 Gosnell No      R Blythe-ville 
 Leachville Yes 0 to 2 N   No  
 Manila Yes 2 V=30 No No No 
Moved to 
Blytheville 
if T doesn’t 
vacate in 
time 
 Osceola Yes 10 D or F $25/day No No SC 
Monroe Brinkley No      18-17-901 is used 
 Clarendon Yes 3 or 4 D or F $25/day No No  
 Holly Grove No      R Claren-don 
Montgom-
ery Mount Ida Yes 3 or 4 D No No No  
Nevada Prescott Yes 6 V  No No  
Newton Jasper No       






 Camden Yes 30 D 
$100/day, 
suspended 
if T vacates 
No No SC 
 Chidester Yes < 1 D     
 East Camden No      Traffic only 
 Stephens Yes <1 D     
Perry Perryville No       
Phillips Elaine No      R Helena 
 Helena Yes 60 F Varies No No SC 
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 Lake View N/A       
 Marvell Yes 5 F $5 to $50 per day No No  
 W. Helena Yes      Counted with Helena 









Poinsett Harrisburg Yes 2  Varies No No SC 
 Lepanto Yes 1 D or F $25/day No No SC 
 Marked Tree Yes 12 D  Maybe Yes SC 
 Truman Yes 2 N $25/day No No SC 
 Tyronza Yes 12 D or F $25/day No No SC 
 Weiner Yes 0     Have not handled any 




Pope Atkins Yes 2 D or F Yes Yes No  
 Dover No       
 London Yes      R Rus-sellville 
 Pottsville No      R Rus-sellville 
 Russellville Yes 16* D or F Yes No Yes  
Prairie Biscoe Yes 1 D No No No  
 Des Arc Yes 1 D No No No SC 
 Devalls Bluff Yes 6 D $75/day No No SC 
 Hazen Yes 3 D $25/day No No SC 
Pulaski Cammack No      Traffic only 
 Jacksonville Yes 41* D or F Yes Some-times Yes  
 Little Rock Yes 475* V and D No No No Ordered to vacate 
 Little Rock-2 No      Traffic only 
 Little Rock-3 No      Environ-mental only 
 Maumelle Yes 35-40 D $225 Some-times No  
 No. Little Rock-1 Yes 104* D or F $25/day No No 
Ordered to 
vacate 




 Pulaski County Yes 22* N Rarely No No  
 Sherwood Yes 14* D $200-300 Some-times No  
 Wrightsville No      Traffic only 
Randolph Pocahontas N/A       
Saline Alexander Yes 10 D or F Yes No No  
 Bauxite N/A       
 Benton Yes 2 D No No No  
 Bryant No      R Benton 
 Haskell No      R Benton 
 Shannon Hills N/A       
Scott Waldron Yes 15 F Yes Yes No  
Searcy Marshall No       
Sebastian Barling N/A       
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 Central City No       
 Fort Smith–all depts Yes 27* D or F $25/day No No  




No No SC 
Sevier DeQueen Yes 3 or 4 F and V Yes Yes No Ordered to vacate 
Sharp Ash Flat No      Use 18-17-901 
 Cherokee Village No       
Stone Mountain View Yes < 1 N 
$145, only 
if T doesn’t 
leave 
No No  
St. Francis Forrest City Yes 30 to 40 F $240 Rarely No SC, most of the time 
 Madison No      R Forrest City 
Union El Dorado No      18-17-901 
Van Buren Clinton No       
Washing-
ton Elkins No      SC 
 Elm Springs Yes      
No cases 
for last few 
years 
 Farmington No       
 Fayetteville Yes 1 or 2 F $100 No No SC 
 Greenland No       
 Johnson No      SC 
 Lincoln No       
 Prairie Grove No      SC 
 Springdale Yes 100 D, F  Yes, if ordered No  
 West Fork No       
White Bald Knob No       
 Beebe Yes 1 to 3 D, F Yes Yes No  
 Bradford No      R Searcy 
 Judsonia No      R Searcy 
 Kensett No      R Searcy 
 McRae No      R Searcy 
 Pangburn No      R Searcy 
 Rosebud No      R Searcy 
 Searcy Yes 12* D, F Yes  No  
Woodruff Augusta Yes 24 F  Some-times No  







12 D or F $200 No No SC 









times No  
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APPENDIX B 
FAILURE TO VACATE DEFENDANTS BY RACE AND SEX 
Race and Sex Little Rock Springdale 
Asian or Pacific Is. 
Females 1 (.3%) 4 (3%) 
Asian or Pacific Is. 
Males 0 1 (1%) 
Black Females 248 (63%) 7 (6%) 
Black Males 96 (24%) 5 (4%) 
Hispanic Females 2 (.5%) 3 (3%) 
Hispanic Males 2 (.5%) 5 (4%) 
Marshallese Females 0 6 (5%) 
Marshallese Males 0 6 (5%) 
White Females 30 (8%) 36 (31%) 
White Males 17 (4%) 25 (22%) 
N/A Females 0 11 (9%) 
N/A Males 0 7 (6%) 
Total 396 116 
Total Percent Female 72% 57% 
 
